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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNITS IN THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY AFTER AMERICAN HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD
INTRODUCTION
Two electricians, working for different employers, both want to join unions.
One electrician is employed by a manufacturing company, and the other is
employed by a community hospital. These two employers are likely to react
differently to union organization. Both employees would like to join a union
composed solely of electricians because this composition would be more effec-
tive for collective bargaining with their employers. Interestingly, the union at-
tempting to organize electricians at the manufacturing plant would be much
more likely to be successful in attaining its goal than the union at the hospital.
The ultimate goal for both of these unions is to be in an election conducted by
the National Labor Relations Board,1 thereby gaining the right to represent
the workers in collective bargaining.
The electricians who work for the hospital are likely to have a difficult time
organizing an electrician-only union. Although they perform exactly the same
kind of work as the electricians who work for the manufacturing company, the
National Labor Relations Board is unlikely to find that a group consisting
solely of electricians would constitute an "appropriate unit"2 for collective bar-
gaining within a hospital. In order to bargain collectively with the hospital, the
union may need to organize not just electricians, but all of the hospital's non-
professional employees. Small wonder that it may be difficult for the commu-
nity hospital electrician to understand why he is not entitled to have the same
representation as his manufacturing plant counterpart.
The above electricians are fictional, but similar stories could be told about
other hospital employees: registered nurses, technical employees, maintenance
employees, office clerical employees, or skilled craftsmen who have worked for
hospitals instead of other employers. Probably very few hospital employees un-
derstand why unions consisting solely of electricians or office clerical employ-
ees or nurses or boiler operators are perfectly appropriate in other settings but
are not appropriate in hospitals.
This Note explains how hospital employees came to be treated differently
than their nonhospital counterparts. This Note also explains how a recent
1. The National Labor Relations Board is the federal agency that administers the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 151-169 (1988). For a full discussion of the
structure, powers, and duties of the Board, see infra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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Rule," adopted by the National Labor Relations Board, increases the range of
choices available to hospital employees because it designates eight groupings
of employees which are appropriate for collective bargaining within hospitals.4
For example, the Rule would not permit electricians to comprise a separate
unit for collective bargaining within hospitals, but it would allow them to or-
ganize into a unit consisting of various skilled maintenance employees.0
Part I of this Note traces the development of federal labor law in its treat-
ment of health care employers and their employees as a result of their involve-
ment with profound societal concerns of caring for the sick and aged. Part I
also describes the development of collective bargaining in hospitals, focusing
on decisions of the National Labor Relations Board and federal courts. These
decisions have held that separate units, consisting solely of registered nurses or
skilled maintenance employees, were not appropriate for collective bargaining.
Part II centers on the National Labor Relations Board's decision to develop
a rule which dictates that eight, and only eight, units are the prescribed num-
ber of units appropriate for collective bargaining within hospitals. Part III re-
counts the hospital industry's challenge to the Rule: American Hospital Asso-
ciation v. National Labor Relations Board.6 In that case, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois permanently enjoined the
Board's use of the Rule.7 Part IV analyzes the decision and concludes that the
court should have upheld the Rule. This conclusion is based on the Rule's
effectuation of congressional intent to promote collective bargaining in hospi-
tals, yet discourage disruptions to patient care. Part V assesses the impact of
enjoining the rule, which struck a balance between employers and employees
in assuring hospital employees their organizational rights. Additionally, Part V
offers legislative proposals to determine collective bargaining units for hospi-
tals if the Rule does not withstand judicial review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The National Labor Relations Act
1. His'torical Developments
American workers have a long tradition of binding together to achieve
changes in their terms and conditions of employment. 8 Employers responded to
this by resorting to state and federal laws to inhibit labor's efforts to organize
3. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1989).
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. II1. 1989), appeals docketed, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605, (7th Cir. Aug.
1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989) (oral argument, Jan. 10, 1990).
7. Id. at 716.
8. See, e.g., H, MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 3-11 (1950)
[hereinafter MILLIS & BROWN] (tracing the history of the labor movement and attempts by man-
agement to counter labor organization).
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and engage in collective action during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.9
Assisted by the government, employers initially relied upon criminal conspir-
acy doctrine to prosecute workers for acting in concert to raise wages.'" When
the criminal conspiracy doctrine fell into disfavor," employers turned to other
measures such as seeking injunctions. 2 For instance, when confronted with
strikes, employers frequently petitioned courts to grant injunctions against
striking employees. The courts often responded favorably, finding "either the
object or the means used by labor in its concerted activities to be unlawful.""3
State and federal antitrust laws were also used to declare labor strikes, boy-
cotts, and picketing unlawful."'
Government leaders gradually recognized that disputes between employers
and employees over collective bargaining recognition harmed interstate com-
merce. 5 Federal labor policy began to change from "suppression" to "toler-
ance" to "acceptance and encouragement" of collective bargaining. 6 By 1935,
Congress recognized that disruptions in interstate commerce, caused by dis-
putes between labor and business, were primarily a result of the inequality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.' 7 This imbalance in bar-
gaining power was subsequently addressed through legislation.
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA" or "the Act" or "the Wagner Act").' The NLRA stated
that it was national labor policy to promote the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining.'" Section 7 of the Act grants and protects employees'
9. Id. at 4-5.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 6-7. Criminal conspiracy became an increasingly difficult avenue to pursue because
prosecutions of employees for "attempts to raise wages were politically unpopular." Id.
12. Id. at 7. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930)
(recounting the history of injunctions in labor disputes).
13. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 8, at 8; see, e.g., Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co., 83 F. 912
(10th Cir. 1897) (granting an injunction against employees' efforts to persuade customers to boy-
cott the employer); United Mach. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 237 Mass. 537, 130 N.E. 86 (1921) (grant-
ing an injunction against striking employees); Vegelahan v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077
(1896) (granting an injunction against employees' patrolling of employer's premises in labor
dispute).
14. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 8, at 9-12; see, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443 (1921) (holding that a labor boycott is not exempt from the antitrust laws); Loewe
v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (holding that a boycott is an unlawful combination in restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (describing Congress' recognition that labor disputes caused
disruptions in interstate commerce).
16. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 8, at 4. Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932
which restricted the ability of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. 88
101-115 (1988).
17. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 8, at 26-27. Congress began to recognize that disputes over
recognizing unions for collective bargaining were wasteful and disrupted the flow of goods in inter-
state commerce. Id. at 27.
18. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The Act expresses that it is the policy of the United States "to
encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . . by protecting the exercise by
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rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection.2 0 Congress also created an agency, the National La-
bor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board"), to administer the Act. 1
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection." Id.
Congress adopted, this policy in response to the "inequality of bargaining power between em-
ployees and ...employers" which resulted in labor disputes with harmful effects on interstate
commerce. Id. Congress stated the extension of a statutory right to engage in collective bargaining
would help to "restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and employees." Id.
The term "collective bargaining" means "a procedure looking toward making of collective
agreements between employer and accredited representative of employees concerning wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 238-39 (5th ed.
1979). Collective bargaining also "requires that parties deal with each other with open and fair
minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles existing between them to the end that em-
ployment relations may be stabilized and obstruction to free flow of commerce prevented." Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 7 of the Act provides in pertinent part: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " id.
21. 49 Stat. 449 § 3 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988)). The Board
originally consisted of three members; it now consists of five members who are appointed by the
President, subject to Senate approval. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988). The Board's statutory duties
include determining an appropriate unit of employees for collective bargaining purposes and the
investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices. Id. §§ 159(a), 160.
The Board acts primarily as a quasi-judicial body, deciding issues raised in representation cases
and unfair labor practice cases. See 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 1600 (2d ed.
1983); 53 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988). The Board may designate its powers to a panel consisting
of three members. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1988). The Board does not act on its own motion. 53
NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988). Instead, cases and controversies arise before the Board after action is
taken in the Board's regional offices. Id.
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA created the position of the General Counsel of the
Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988). The General Counsel supervises and directs the Board's
regional offices. 53 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988). The General Counsel has final authority to inves-
tigate, issue complaints, and prosecute unfair labor practices. Id.; see also J. FEERICK, H. BAER &
J. ARFA, I NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 36 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter FEERICK] (describing the powers and duties of the General Counsel).
The Board also delegates responsibilities to directors of its regional offices to investigate and
prosecute unfair labor practice charges. Id. at 37. If the regional director or General Counsel
determines that a charge is meritorious, he or she will issue a complaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1988). Unfair labor practice complaints are first heard before an administrative law judge. See
id. § 160(c). The administrative law judge issues a recommended decision and order. Parties may
file exceptions to the judge's decision and request the Board to review it. Id.; see also R. GORMAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION & COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 7-9 (1976) (describing
the relationship of the Board to the General Counsel in unfair labor practice proceedings).
The Board is also charged with the responsibility of determining whether questions concerning
representation exist. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1988). The Board is "authorized to delegate to its
regional directors its powers under section 159 of this title to determine the unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate whether a question of representation exists, and
to direct an election." Id. The regional director is also empowered to certify the winner of an
election or, if there is no union selected, to certify the results. Id. Parties dissatisfied with decisions
of the regional director in representational matters may request review by the Board. 29 C.F.R. §
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2. The National Labor Relations Board and Employee Representation
Congress authorized the NLRB to implement two primary objectives. 2
First, Congress charged the Board with the responsibility of settling disputes
concerning the desires of employees to be represented by a labor organiza-
tion 2 3 as their exclusive collective bargaining representative.2 4 Second, the
Board was empowered to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate unlawful em-
ployer behavior that Congress had designated as "unfair labor practices."2 5 In
1947, Congress separated the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of the
NLRB by creating the office of the General Counsel of the Board. 6 Congress
empowered the General Counsel to investigate and prosecute unfair labor
practices.2 7 Consequently, the NLRB now acts primarily as a quasi-judicial
body,28 deciding questions concerning representation decisions and unfair labor
102.67(b) (1989).
22. See Feerick, supra note 21, at 27; 53 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988).
23. Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines the term "labor organization" to mean "any organiza-
tion of any kind, or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(5) (1988).
24. FEERICK, supra note 21, at 27, 31-32.
25. Id. at 27. Section 8(a) of the NLRA designates activities by employers which Congress
deemed to be "unfair labor practices." See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988). The NLRA originally
listed only employer unfair labor practices under § 8(1) which are now listed under § 8(a)(1)-(5).
See id. § 158(a)(l)-(5). Two unfair labor practices will be referred to frequently in this Note.
Section 8(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Id. § 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(5) makes it
unlawful for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees subject to the provisions of section 159." Id. § 158(a)(5). Section 9(a) of the Act states,
"[rlepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purpose shall be the exclusive representative of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining." Id. § 159(a).
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act added § 8(b) which designated certain behavior by
unions as unfair labor practices. See id. § 150(b)(1)-(7).
26. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (1988)).
27. Id.
28. The NLRB consists of five members appointed by the President and approved by the Sen-
ate. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Despite the fact that the NLRB possesses a broad
grant of rulemaking power, the Board has rarely invoked rulemaking. The Board has opted in-
stead to develop national labor law in a common law fashion through adjudications of cases and
controversies. See Gregory, The National Labor Relations Board and the Politics of Labor Law,
27 B.C.L. REV. 39, 39-43 (1985). Not surprisingly, changes in administrations and Board mem-
bership often produce changes in existing Board law. Id. at 45-46 (comparing reversals in policy
by the "Reagan Board" from policies established by the "Carter Board"); see also Estreicher,
Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 163, 163 n.l,
164-66 (listing thirty reversals in Board policy and law during the first four years of the Reagan
presidency). The change of even a single member can often tilt the balance to change Board law,
only to be reversed again when another administration appoints a majority of the Board. For an
example of judicial criticism of how the Board's continually shifting policies creates uncertainty
for employers, employees, and unions, see Mosey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir.
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practices. 9
Judicial review of Board decisions is limited. In order to hasten the begin-
ning of collective bargaining, Congress declined to authorize direct judicial
review of representational issues."0 Congress, however, did authorize judicial
review in the federal courts of appeals of final orders in unfair labor practice
proceedings."
Congress created section 932 of the Act to enable workers to select exclusive
collective bargaining representatives through a majority vote in secret-ballot
elections supervised by the NLRB13 If a majority of the employees voting in
the election 4 select a labor-organization to represent them, the labor organiza-
tion or union "shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such
1983) (en banc) (stating that the Board's standard "in policing [union] elections ... has changed
... three times in .. .five and a half years").
29. See 53 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988).
30. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
congressional intent was "firmly against direct review . . . because time-consuming review might
defeat objectives of national labor policy" to promote collective bargaining). Nevertheless, repre-
sentational issues may be raised in the context of judicial review in unfair labor practice proceed-
ings. For a comprehensive discussion of the interplay between the NLRB and the federal courts,
see infra notes 206-75 and accompanying text.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1988); see infra notes 206-75 and accompanying text.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988).
33. See id. Although the Act creates election processes to determine collective bargaining rep-
resentatives, NLRB elections are not the sole route to recognition. Employers may voluntarily
recognize unions as exclusive collective bargaining representatives without an NLRB-conducted
election. See I C. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 488. The Act does, however, require that a labor
organization represent a majority of the workers in the selected unit in order to be recognized as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
34. NLRB-conducted elections are scheduled by the regional director, usually within sixty days
of the filing of a petition for a consent election or between twenty-five and thirty days after the
direction of an election. 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 1611. Even if a party files a request for
the Board to review the decision of the regional director, the filing will not stay the election. Id.
Only those employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit "at the end of the payroll
period immediately preceding the date of direction of election or a date set out in the consent
agreement" are eligible to vote in the election. Id. The employer must furnish the Board with a
list of the names and addresses of all eligible voters no more than one week after the date of the
"direction of election or execution of the consent agreement." Id. The Board, in turn, furnishes
that list to the union (or unions if more than one union is involved in the election). The union may
then use the information to contact employees regarding the election. Id. at 1612.
Board agents are responsible for conducting the secret ballot elections which are "ordinarily...
held on the employer's premises. The ballot lists options for each union claiming majority status in
the bargaining unit and for 'no union.'" Id. The employer and the petitioning union or unions are
entitled to have observers present; observers may challenge the eligibility of voters but only for
"good cause." Id. Those individuals who are challenged may cast votes but the Board agent im-
pounds their votes; they "are not considered further unless their number is sufficient to affect the
results of the election." Id.
In order for a union to win the election and become the "certified" exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, it must receive a majority of the valid votes cast in the election. Id. The foregoing
provides only a brief outline of NLRB election procedures. For a comprehensive discussion of the
subject, see FEERICK, supra note 21, at 2-294; 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 341-411; 2 C.
MORRIS, supra note 21, at 1611-14.
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unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.""5 The Act imposes a duty36 on
employers to bargain collectively with those representatives by making it un-
lawful for employers to refuse to do so.37
Although the NLRB oversees representation proceedings, the Board does
not act on its own motion.3 8 Instead, employees must trigger the Board's par-
ticipation by filing a petition for a representation election. This petition must
be supported by a showing that they want to be represented by a union. 9 If
the employees make the required showing, then the Board investigates to de-
termine what issues are likely to be raised before the election. One major issue
concerns classifying employees into categories for purposes of union represen-
tation."0 If the parties consent to an election within a category of employees
holding certain job classifications, the Board will conduct an election in that
"unit." '41 When the parties do not consent, the Board must determine the ap-
propriate bargaining unit,"2 although the Act provides few guidelines for mak-
35. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). The Board shall certify the results of the election to both the
labor organization and the employer. Id. § 159(e).
36. See id. § 158(d).
37. Id. § 158(a)(5).
38. 53 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988).
39. Section 9(c)(1)(A) requires the Board to investigate to determine whether a question con-
cerning representation exists if a "substantial" number of employees desire union representation.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1988). The Board, through its rules, requires that at least 30% of the
employees must want union representation before it will conduct an election. 29 C.F.R. §
101.18(a)(4) (1989). The NLRB determines the 30% showing through a count of authorization
cards signed by the employees indicating their desire to be represented by a union. For a compre-
hensive description of the election process and procedures, see FEERICK, supra note 21, at 75-294.
40. FEERICK, supra note 21, at 233, 299-301. The "unit" concept can be misleading and con-
fusing. R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 66. The unit consists of jobs or job classifications "and not
of the particular persons working at that time"; the unit does not change merely because an
employee leaves or is replaced by another employee. Id. The term "appropriate bargaining unit" is
more accurately referred to as "the appropriate election unit since employees represented in differ-
ent election units may choose to 're-group' as a single larger entity for purposes of conducting
actual negotiations." Id. (emphasis in original).
41. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(a), 102.69 (1989). The parties may use one of two types of consent
elections that are carried out by the regional office of the Board. "The first, a consent-election
agreement ('pure consent') provides for an election with final authority over any disputes vested
with the regional director. The second, a stipulation for certification ('stipulation consent') is simi-
lar in form except that it vests final determination of any disputes with the Board itself." 2 C.
MORRIS, supra note 21, at 1608.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988). The Act authorizes the Board to determine a unit appropriate
for collective bargaining. Id. The NLRB is authorized to delegate to its regional directors its
powers to determine questions concerning representation, determine questions concerning the ap-
propriate bargaining unit, direct elections, and certify results. Id. § 153(b). Parties may appeal
decisions of the regional directors to the Board. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (1989).
The procedure for contesting the classifications in the proposed unit begins with a representa-
tion hearing. Id. § 102.63(a). The hearings are nonadversarial in nature and parties are free to
call witnesses and admit evidence regarding the classifications in the proposed unit. 2 C. MORRIS,
supra note 21, at 1609. After the close of the hearing, the hearing officer issues a report to the
regional director. Id. The regional director may decide to dismiss the petition, or alternatively, to
direct an election. If he decides to direct an election, he must specify the appropriate unit. Id.
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ing unit determinations. a The Board traditionally determines whether employ-
ees share a sufficient "community of interest" to warrant inclusion in a given
unit.44 The appropriate bargaining unit decision vitally affects employers, em-
ployees, and unions.' The selection of unit size, composition,46 and scope 47
may determine whether there will be any election at all. 48 Additionally, the
unit decision may affect whether a particular union will be able to receive a
majority of the votes cast to become the exclusive representative for the em-
ployees in that unit. 9
Labor organizations tend to prefer the organization of smaller, homogene-
ous units of employees. This is a logical preference because it is easier to ob-
tain the required showing of interest in smaller units"0 and win NLRB-con-
ducted representation elections in those units. 5 1 Employers generally prefer
larger and more heterogeneous units because unions are usually less successful
in organizing and winning elections in those units.5 2 If no union receives a
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988). The only guidelines are that the NLRB must find a unit
appropriate "to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter." Id.
44. For a full discussion of the factors which the Board uses to make unit determinations,
including "community of interest," see infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
45. See J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BAR-
GAINING UNIT 284-90 (rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter ABODEELY]. The decision establishes "the for-
mal arena of employee organizational efforts and the framework of mutual bargaining duties at
the base of the entire collective bargaining process." I C. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 413.
46. Unit composition refers to the type of employees in job classifications to be represented in
the unit. ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 277.
47. Unit scope refers to the facility or facilities which will be covered by the proposed unit. Id.
For example, in retail facilities there is a presumption in favor of a single-store unit. See, e.g.,
Frisch's Big Boy II1.-Mar. Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th
Cir. 1966) (holding that a single location is presumptively appropriate). But see NLRB v. Chi-
cago Health & Tennis Clubs, 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a multi-location unit is
appropriate), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904. (1978).
48. See Abodeely, supra note 45, at 284. The Act requires the Board to determine that a
"substantial" number of employees have indicated their wish to be represented by a labor organi-
zation for collective bargaining purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1988). The NLRB has deter-
mined there must be a 30% "showing of interest" before it will direct an election. 29 C.F.R. §
101.18(a)(4) (1989). "It is clearly more difficult to get the requisite showing of interest from a
large group than from a small one." ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 284.
49. 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 413. "A union which may have organized a sufficient num-
ber of employees within a small unit may not be able to establish its majority in a larger unit.
Similarly, the scope and composition of the bargaining unit may determine which of two contend-
ing unions gains representative status." Id.
50. ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 284.
51. Id. at 284, 289-90; see also Delaney & Sockell, Hospital Unit Determination and the Pres-
ervation of Employee Free Choice, 39 LAB. L.J. 259, 270 (1988) (stating that unions prefer to
organize in smaller units because they are more likely to win the election and become the exclu-
sive representative for collective bargaining).
52. Delaney & Sockell, supra note 51, at 270. Employers also favor fewer units because it is
easier to bargain with fewer units than many. Id. See generally I. ROTHENBERG & S. SILVERMAN,
LABOR UNIONS, How TO AVERT THEM, BEAT THEM, OUT-NEGOTIATE THEM, LIVE WITH THEM,
UNLOAD THEM (1973) (stating that employers actually would usually prefer to "live without
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majority of the votes cast, the employer does not have a statutory obligation to
bargain collectively with the employees in that unit.53 In addition, the em-
ployer is free from representation elections in that unit for one year. 5
3. Hospitals and the National Labor Relations Act
The NLRB first asserted jurisdiction over nonprofit hospitals in 1943. 5 This
jurisdiction was proper because, when Congress passed the NLRA, hospitals
were not excluded from the definition of "employer. 56 Only four years later,
Congress excluded nonprofit hospitals from the Act's coverage when it passed
the Taft-Hartley amendments.5 7 Although there was little debate on the issue,
two explanations have been suggested for the exemption. 8 First, Congress
considered nonprofit hospitals to be local in nature, with little impact on inter-
state commerce. 59 Second, Congress may have excluded nonprofit hospitals be-
cause they were often charitable institutions.6"
unions").
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). Unless a labor organization receives the majority of the
votes cast, it cannot become the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in
that unit. Id.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988); see 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 352-53 (describing the
purpose and details of the one-year election bar on elections in a given unit or its subdivision).
55. Central Dispensary and Emergency Hosp., 57 N.L.R.B. 393 (1943), enforced, 145 F.2d
852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945). Hospitals generally fall into one of three
categories. R. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 16-18 (5th ed. 1986). Proprietary or inves-
tor-owned hospitals are hospitals which are privately owned and operated for a profit. Id. at 17.
Private, nonprofit hospitals differ because they are privately owned but are not operated for a
profit. Id. Public hospitals are created by statute and may be federal, state, county, or municipal
institutions. Id. at 16. Public hospitals are exempt from coverage under the Act because of the
political subdivision exemption in section 2(2). 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). The NLRA, as origi-
nally enacted, did not exclude either proprietary or nonprofit hospitals from the definition of "em-
ployer." 49 Stat. 450 § 2 (1935).
56. 49 Stat. 449 § 2 (1935). The NLRB may only assert jurisdiction over "employers" and
"employees" within the meaning of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (1988). For example, states
and political subdivisions are expressly excluded from the definition of "employer," while agricul-
tural laborers, domestic servants, supervisors, and independent contractors are excluded from the
definition of "employee." Id.
57. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§9 141-197 (1988)). The bill is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. See ABODEELY. supra
note 45, at 242-43. The amendments changed the statutory definition of employer to exclude "any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual .... " 61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947), (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988)), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR &
PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 412 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
LEGiS. HIST.].
58. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 94 (state-
ment of Sen. Williams).
59. Id. The Board may only exercise jurisdiction over labor disputes "affecting commerce." 29
U.S.C. § 152(7) (1988). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA under the
commerce clause. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 43, 48-49 (1937).
60. Nonprofit hospitals may have been exempted from coverage under the Act because, as Sen-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:505
In the years after the Taft-Hartley amendments, until the 1970's, the health
care industry expanded in both its size and its volume of business.6" In addi-
tion, the "charitable nature" of the industry changed. 62 In fact, the NLRB
had already asserted jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals, 6 3 and additionally,
over both proprietary6' and nonprofit nursing homes.66
As a result of this physical and financial growth in hospitals, labor unrest
arose. Although the NLRA's exclusion of hospitals did not make union organi-
zation by nonprofit hospital employees illegal, nonprofit hospital employees
found it difficult to organize. 66 The main reason for this difficulty stemmed
from the Act's failure to impose a statutory duty to recognize unions as collec-
tive bargaining agents.67 Despite this obstacle, unions began organizational
drives among hospital employees during the 1950s and 1960s. 68 The unions
ator Tydings urged:
This amendment is designed merely to help a great number of hospitals which are
having very difficult times. They are eleemosynary institutions, no profit is involved in
their operations, and I understand from the hospital association that this amendment
would be very helpful in their efforts to serve those who have not the means to pay for
hospital services.
FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, IMPACT OF THE 1974 HEALTH CARE AMEND-
MENTS TO THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 12 n.5
(1979) [hereinafter IMPACT] (citing 93 CONG. REc. 4997 (1947)); see also 120 CONG. REC.
12,937 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 94 (statement of Sen. Williams) (ex-
plaining that hospitals were excluded because they were charitable in nature and had slight im-
pact on interstate commerce).
61. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 94 (state-
ment of Sen. Williams). In 1973, hospitals employed over three million people, more than ten
times the amount of hospital workers employed at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments. Id.
Private, nonprofit hospitals employed nearly "1 million employees, or 56 percent of all hospital
employees." Id.
62. Id. The private, nonprofit hospital was identified as a "big business," id., with a substantial
impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 12,937, LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 95 (statement of
Sen. Williams). The reference to "big business" demonstrates that these hospitals had "outgrown
their old status as local charitable institutions." Id.
During the floor debates on legislation, which would ultimately bring private nonprofit hospitals
under the NLRA, Senator Williams noted that in nonprofit hospitals the price per bed, the wages
and salaries of supervisors and executives, and the ability to participate in business ventures to
gain tax deductions were comparable to those in private hospitals. Id.
63. Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967), overruling, Flatbush Gen. Hosp.
126 N.L.R.B. 144, 146 (1960).
64. University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 265 (1967).
65. Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1047 (1970). Although, "[tihere [was] virtually no
difference between employees of profit and of nonprofit hospitals," the statutory exclusion pre-
vented the Board from asserting jurisdiction over private nonprofit hospitals. 120 CONG. REC.
12,938 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 95 (statement of Sen. Williams).
66. See Comment, Labor Law: Hospital Employees, 3 U. ILL. L.F. 542 (1973) (stating that
workers who lack protective legislation for organizing and collective bargaining are unduly ham-
pered in their organizing efforts).
67. Id. at 549. As one commentator has observed, "the right to join a union is virtually mean-
ingless unless it is coupled with the right of recognition." Id. (citing P. SULLIVAN, PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE LABOR LAW 36 (1969)).
68. The National Union of Hospitals and Health Care Employees, also known as 1199, and the
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organized strikes and pickets to persuade employers to recognize them as col-
lective bargaining representatives.69 Recognitional strikes were often bitter,
and as a result, the strikes frequently worsened employer-employee relations
and disrupted patient care.7
Congress was slow to respond to labor unrest in nonprofit hospitals. Follow-
ing the congressional silence, few states passed legislation to bring nonprofit
hospitals within the coverage of state labor laws." With little likelihood of
Service Employees International Union were two of the major unions involved in health care or-
ganizing. Pointer, The 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 26
LAB. L.J. 350, 351 (1975). These unions emphasized their appeal to employees in this industry
where workers were "notoriously underpaid." 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 57, at 93 (statement of Sen. Cranston).
69. Kochery & Strauss, The Nonprofit Hospital and the Union, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 255, 255
(1960). In 1959 and 1960, recognitional strikes lasted forty-six days in New York, eighty-four
days in Seattle, and over four months in Chicago, while threatened strikes and organizing oc-
curred in Baltimore, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Miami, Rochester, and Buffalo. Id. n.1 (citing 34
Hosps. 112-14 (1960)); see also IMPACT, supra note 60, at 50-51 (stating that "labor unrest was
also in evidence in at least twenty-six cities throughout the country").
This alternative method was forced upon the unions since they were unable to use the represen-
tational procedures of the Act to secure recognition. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,938 (1974), reprinted
in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 94-95 (statement of Sen. Williams).
70. 120 CONG. REC. 12,944 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 96. Senator
Williams remarked:
The recognition strike is the primary and most disruptive form of labor conflict in
nonprofit hospitals. It accounts for 95% of the strikes in these hospitals.
The denial of recognition of a union as the representative of employees in nonprofit
hospitals . . . erupts in long and wasteful strikes which not only hurt employees and
employers, but also disrupts health care for patients.
The long recognition strikes which have plagued the nonprofit hospital industry in-
evitably result in an atmosphere of bitterness and conflict. Working relationships are
never totally repaired. When employees are forced to strike for the basic right of
representation, and afterward to settle for unsatisfactory conditions, frustration and
bitterness set in. The quality of health services is bound to suffer in such an atmo-
sphere of conflict.
120 CONG. REC. 12,936-37 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 96-97 (statement
of Sen. Williams).
71. A 1979 study by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service reported that only twelve
states had passed some form of labor law coverage for nonprofit hospitals by 1974. IMPACT, supra
note 60, at 33; see also Comment, supra note 66, at 552-57 (describing state laws excluding and
including nonprofit hospitals from protective state legislation).
Varying widely in scope and manner of coverage, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, and Ver-
mont explicitly excluded private nonprofit hospitals from coverage under their labor relations laws.
Comment, supra note 66, at 551 n.52 (citing ND. CENT. CODE § 34-12-01(2) (Supp. 1972); R.I.
GEN. LAWS. § 28-7-45 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20-2(2) (Supp. 1972); and VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1502(7)(E) (1972)). Other states including Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York,
explicitly covered nonprofit hospitals. Id. at 551 n.51 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-101(7)
(West 1960), as amended (West Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 2(3) (West
Supp. 1972); and N.Y. LAB. LAW § 701(12) (McKinney 1965)). Still other states prohibited
strikes by nonprofit hospital workers. These states instead required compulsory arbitration to re-
solve disputes between hospitals and their employees. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
New York each adopted this approach. Id. at 559 n.103 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
1llb (West Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 9A (West Supp. 1972); MINN.
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obtaining uniform, favorable legislation on a state-by-state basis, organized la-
bor shifted its focus from the individual states to Washington in an attempt to
persuade Congress to include nonprofit hospitals within the coverage of the
NLRA.
7 2
B. The 1974 Health Care Amendments
1. Hospitals Receive Specialized Treatment Under the NLRA
a. The Thompson Bill
In 1971, Representative Frank Thompson, Jr., responding to requests from
organized labor,73 introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to repeal
the exemption.7 " After conducting hearings,75 the House quickly passed the
bill.76 During Senate hearings, 77 however, the hospital industry vigorously op-
posed the legislation71 causing the measure to never be sent to the floor.79 Hos-
pital industry representatives insisted that the mere extension of the NLRA to
nonprofit hospitals would not serve the public interest of receiving uninter-
rupted patient care.80 The hospital industry, therefore, proposed amendments
to minimize disruptions in patient care during labor disputes arising under the
STAT. ANN. § 179.38 (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 716(2), (3)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1965)).
72. Pointer, supra note 68, at 352; see also IMPACT, supra note 60, at 16-17 (stating that a
"state-by-state legislative approach is no longer desirable," and uniform laws are needed through-
out the country).
73. See IMPACT, supra note 60, at 16-17 (stating that Service Employees International Union
("SEIU") and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-
CIO") urged Representative Thompson to introduce legislation and hold hearings).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) (citing H.R. 11,357, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1971)), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 269.
75. See Extension of N.L.R.A. to Nonprofit Hospital Employees: Hearings on H.R. 11,357
Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 92d Cong.,
1st and 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter Hearings 1].
76. The House passed the bill by a vote of 285-95 in August 1972. H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 270. The Senate then held
hearings on H.R. 11,357 during 1972 but no further action was taken during that session. LEGIs.
HIST., supra note 57, at 270.
77. See Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings
on H.R. 11,357 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Wel-
fare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter Hearings 11].
78. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 18-19; Pointer, supra note 68, at 353.
79. After H.R. 11,357 passed the House, it was transferred to the Senate for passage. LEcIS.
HIST., supra note 57, at 270. Two studies report that Senator Williams, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, favored passage of the bill and planned to send it di-
rectly to the floor without holding hearings. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 19-20; Pointer, supra note
68, at 353. The American Hospital Association and state hospital associations, however, pressured
the Senate to refer the bill to committee to hold a hearing. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 18-20. The
hearing was intended to be a mere formality as "the committee had planned to mark up the bill
• . . and forward it to the floor" for a vote. Pointer, supra note 68, at 353. Two studies have
suggested that but for the efforts of the hospital associations to refer the bill to committee, the
amendment would have passed. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 18-19; Pointer, supra note 68, at 353.
80. See Pointer, supra note 68, at 353.
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Act.8"
The industry's proposed amendments focused mainly on notice requirements
to hospitals in order to inform them of any worker instability. Many of the
industry proposals included adequate notice to hospitals regarding contract
modification or terminations, and mediation and fact-finding procedures. 82 In
addition, these proposals required advance notice to the hospital of any
planned strike or other work stoppage, in order to enable hospitals to provide
continuity of patient care.83
The hospital associations also sought to impose limits on hospital employees'
abilities to organize for collective bargaining.8" Industry spokesmen were
alarmed by what they perceived as the NLRB's tendency to find appropriate
separate units for pharmacists, laboratory technologists, registered nurses, and
licensed practical nurses.85 The industry was even more disturbed by the pat-
tern of representation permitted under state labor laws. 88 New York alone had
"[b]alkanized hospitals into [21 separate] bargaining units. '87 The hospital
industry predicted that a multiplicity of bargaining units would adversely af-
fect the industry because it would be possible for a small unit of employees to
control the hospital.8 8 A small group of employees, who perform vital func-
tions, would be capable of shutting down a facility and creating jurisdictional
disputes.89 'These employees would also be capable of causing wage competi-
81. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 18-22; Pointer, supra note 68, at 353.
82. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 18-20 (describing proposals offered by the Federation of Ameri-
can Hospitals and the California Hospital Association).
83. Id.
84. The American Hospital Association informed the Senate Labor Subcommittee of the over
one hundred job classifications in health care facilities, noting that many were "critical to the
efficient operation of hospitals." See Hearings II, supra note 77, at 34 (statement of David Hitt,
American Hosp. Ass'n). Additionally, a state hospital association warned Congress that un-
restricted employee organization allowed by the NLRA already contributed to the fragmentation
of the workforce into many small units in the construction and newspaper industries. See id. at
238-39 (statement of Jerry Ransohoff, Greater Cincinnati Hosp. Council & Ohio Hosp. Ass'n).
While reminding Congress that a unit of only six employees was able to "tie up" a newspaper's
operations, the hospital association predicted that it was "conceivable" for a single unit of labora-
tory technologists to "close a major hospital." See id. at 238 (statement of Jerry Ransohoff,
Greater Cincinnati Hosp. Council & Ohio Hosp. Ass'n).
85. See id. at 34-35 (statement of David Hitt, American Hosp. Ass'n); id. at 171 (testimony of
California Hosp. Ass'n).
86. See id. at 35 (statement of David Hitt, American Hosp. Ass'n). The association predicted
that the NLRB, if unchecked, would continue to approve of separate units of professionals,
paraprofessionals, and the many craft employees who work in hospitals. Id.
87. See Hearings I, supra note 75, at 199 (statement of Michael Browne, Hospital Personnel
Administrators of Greater New York); Hearings 11, supra note 77, at 300-01 (statement of
Michael Browne, Hospital Personnel Administrators of Greater New York).
88. See Hearings II, supra note 77, at 35 (statement of David Hitt, American Hosp. Ass'n)
(stating, "any one of these many bargaining units, even a very small bargaining unit within the
institution, could close down the entire facility because of the general practice of all bargaining
units to respect the picketing efforts of others").
89. See id. ("[T]he existence of numerous bargaining units could lead to many jurisdictional
disputes."). A jurisdictional dispute is "a disagreement, controversy, or conflict between two or
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tion among bargaining units that would, in turn, drive up costs of medical care
and impose heavy administrative labor relations costs on hospitals.90
b. The Taft Bill
During Senate hearings in 1973, 91 Senator Robert Taft, Jr., promptly intro-
duced a new bill9 2 that was not designed merely to extend the NLRA, but
instead, to provide specialized treatment for hospitals.9" His bill proposed re-
pealing the exemption and adding a definition of "health care institution" that
embraced both proprietary and nonprofit institutions. 4 The bill also addressed
the industry's desire for additional time, in the event of labor disputes, to pro-
tect patient care. The proposal required parties to satisfy three requirements:
provide longer notice of intent to modify or terminate contracts,95 participate
in mandatory mediation,96 and provide thirty days notice prior to any strike or
work stoppage.97
In addition to these modifications, Senator Taft also proposed a new section
to the NLRA, section 9(f), to limit the number of appropriate collective bar-
more unions concerning the assignment of or the right to perform, certain types of work." H.
ROBERTS, ROBERT'S DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 329 (3d ed. 1986).
90. See Hearings 11, supra note 77, at 300-01 (statement of David Hitt, American Hosp.
Ass'n). These were not trivial concerns. As Senator Dominick, an opponent of extending the
NLRA to hospitals, explained: "(h]ospital care is not storable. It is essentially an immediate ser-
vice to the sick and injured . . . .If the health care nurse . . . and many other . . . specialists are
not at or near the bedside ...the hospital ceases to function and the public interest .. .and
welfare [are] endangered." S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 57, at 46 (views of Sen. Dominick (quoting 0. Ray Hurst, Texas Hosp. Ass'n)).
91. The Senate Subcommittee on Labor conducted hearings on July 31, August 1 and 2, and
October 4 of 1973. Senator Taft introduced his bill on July 31, 1973. Coverage of Nonprofit
Hospitals Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1973: Hearings on S. 794, S. 2292 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter Hearings III].
92. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 449.
Representatives Frank Thompson Jr. and John Ashbrook had previously introduced a bill to sim-
ply repeal the exemption. H.R. 1236, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), cited in H.R. REP. No. 1051,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 270. Senators Alan
Cranston and Jacob Javits introduced an identical bill in the Senate. S. 794, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 448.
93. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 449. One
study has suggested that S. 2292 strongly resembled the proposal offered by the hospital industry
during the 1972 Senate hearings on H.R. 11,357. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 20.
94. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 450. A
health care institution was defined as "any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance
organization, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick
or aged persons." Id. Senator Taft also proposed to exclude physicians from the definition of
"employee" in § 2(3) of the Act. See id.
95. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 451. S.
2292 proposed to add § 8(g) to require parties to provide a ninety-day notice of termination or
modification of the agreement. See id.
96. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1973), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 452.
97. S. 2292, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 454.
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gaining units in health care institutions.9 8 Taft's proposal specified four appro-
priate units: all professional employees,9 9 technical employees, clerical employ-
ees, and service and maintenance employees. 100 These four proposed units were
in addition to a statutory requirement that there be a separate unit for
guards. 1 1 Section 9(f) would have required that the Board not disturb any
pre-existing bargaining units. Section 9(f) also would have permitted employ-
ers and labor organizations to agree to units other than the four specified.10 2
Organized labor opposed several features of the Taft bill, particularly the
proposed limit on bargaining units.103 The United States Department of Labor
agreed with this concern, stating that "unwise unit determinations could be
harmful,"'1 4 but it regarded the safeguard language restricting proliferation to
98. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1973), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at
457-58.
Section 9(f) was "designed to minimize bargaining unit fragmentation and proliferation, which
pose a serious threat to the efficient functioning of health care institutions. Such institutions are
particularly vulnerable to the practice of fractionalizing the work force into numerous units, and
the NLRB has already shown a dangerous tendency in this direction." LEGIs. HIST., supra note
57, at 110.
Some states have confronted the problems posed by multiple units in public employment by
designating appropriate units through statute. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-6 (1987) (applying to
state employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1021 (1985) (applying to state university em-
ployees); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.825 (West 1988) (applying to state employees and providing that
"it is the legislative intent that, in order to foster meaningful collective bargaining, units must be
structured in such a way as to avoid excessive fragmentation whenever possible").
99. Section 2(12) defines the term "professional employee" as follows:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominately intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgement in its performance; (iii)
of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual in-
struction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing
related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to be-
come a professional employee defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1988).
Section 9(b)(1) provides that the NLRB shall not find a mixed unit of professional employees
and nonprofessionals appropriate unless a majority of the professionals first vote for inclusion in
the mixed unit. Id. § 159(b)(1).
100. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 458.
101. Id. The separate unit of guards is required by the Act so as to avoid any conflict of inter-
est that guards might face in dealing with fellow employees as a result of their position. See 29
U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988).
102. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973) reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 458.
103. Andrew Biemiller, Director of the Department of Legislation for the AFL-CIO strenu-
ously objected to a statutory limit on bargaining units. See Hearings III, supra note 91, at 565.
104. Id. at 427, 434 (statement of Richard Schubert, Under Secretary of Labor); see also
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be unnecessary. 08 The Department noted that the Board had "demonstrated
sensitivity" 1 6 to the unit issue, and thus, anticipated the Board would act ac-
cordingly if nonprofit hospitals were brought under the Act.0 7
The debate between mere extension of the NLRA to nonprofit hospitals and
"specialized treatment" for all health care institutions prevented passage of
labor legislation for the health care industry. 08 Shortly thereafter, Senator
Taft proposed a compromise measure, 09 and Senator Williams reintroduced
the compromise measure as a new bill"0 in order to provide greater support
for the compromise."'
c. Senator Williams' Bill
In an attempt to encourage passage of the .legislation, the Congressmen em-
phasized two objectives."' These objectives were to discourage labor upheavals
Fanning, The Health Care Amendments-A Matter of Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB.
201, 208 (1976) (commenting on the administration's opposition to the limit on bargaining units)
[hereinafter Fanning, The Health Care Amendments].
105. See Hearings III, supra note 91, at 434 (statement of Richard Schubert, Under Secretary
of Labor).
106. Id. at 427.
107. Id.
108. See IMPACT, supra note 60, at 21; Pointer, supra note 68, at 353. A commentator has
provided an excellent discussion of the two approaches, culminating in the adoption of "specialized
treatment for health care institutions." See King, Legislative Review: Is Congressional Intent Be-
ing Realized-or Are Significant Changes Needed? in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON HOSPITALS & HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITALS & THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 150-53 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
Key leaders in the Senate met with representatives of both labor and management in the hopes
of working out a compromise. IMPACT, supra note 60, at 21.
109. S. 3088, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 462.
Senator Taft introduced the compromise bill on February 28, 1974. See id. Representatives
Thompson and Ashbrook introduced an identical bill, H.R. 13,678, in the House on March 21,
1974. See H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS HIST., supra note
57, at 270 (reviewing the legislative history of the health care amendments).
110. S. 3203, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 1. By
having Senator Williams introduce the bill as a new measure, all of the other committee members
were able to co-sponsor the legislation, excluding Senator Dominick, who opposed the measure.
Pointer, supra note 68, at 357.
111. The Senate Committee discharged the Labor subcommittee from introducing S. 794, (the
simple extension), S. 2292 (Taft's original bill), and S. 3088 (the compromise bill). S. REP. No.
766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in LEGiS. HIST., supra note 57, at 9. Senator Taft's
bill, which would have imposed a limit on the number of bargaining units, was never reported out
of committee; Congress neither accepted nor rejected the measure. Despite this fact, commenta-
tors have criticized the Board for trying to infer congressional intent regarding unit determina-
tions by claiming that Congress rejected the measure. See, e.g., Bumpass, Appropriate Bargaining
Units in Health Care Institutions: An Analysis of Congressional Intent and its Implementation
by the National Labor Relations Board, 20 B.C.L. REv. 867, 882-86 (1979) (suggesting great
caution should be used in trying to draw inferences from congressional "inaction"); King, supra
note 108, at 147, 154-56 (criticizing the Board for stating that Congress rejected the Taft bill).
112. See 120 CONG. REC. 13,560 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 256-57
(stating that the "twin objectives ... extend NLRA coverage to nonprofit hospital employees ...
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and to install procedural safeguards that would preserve patient care. First,
placing nonprofit hospitals under the NLRA would reduce labor unrest in the
health care industry113 because the availability of NLRA representation elec-
tion procedures would virtually eliminate any need for strikes designed to
achieve recognition." 4 They also stressed that encouraging the process of col-
lective bargaining would tend to improve continuity and quality of patient
care."' Second, since the care of the sick and aged was a great societal con-
cern, they proposed specific procedural safeguards to establish "special ma-
chinery" in order to minimize the potential for disruptions to patient care. 16
The legislation, popularly known as the Health Care Amendments,'1 7 be-
came effective in August of 1974. The procedural safeguards embodied in
Senator Williams' bill were passed by both chambers of Congress.' 8 The
Health Care Amendments repealed the nonprofit hospital exemption" 9 and
created a definition for a "health care institution."' 20 Section 8(d) of the Act
was amended to clarify obligations under this statute. Section 8(d) lengthened
the requirements for notice of contract modification or termination in disputes
involving health care institutions.' 2' In addition, it imposed a duty to engage in
mandatory mediation of disputes under the direction of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service ("FMCS"). 12' Along with the section 8(d) modifica-
[yet they] make[ ] special provision to safeguard hospital patients") (statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
113. 120 CONG. REc. 12,936-37 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 91-92
(statement of Sen. Cranston).
114. 120 CONG. REC. 12,938 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 96-97 (state-
ment of Sen. Williams).
115. Id.
116. 120 CONG. REC. 12,936-37 (1974), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 91-92
(statement of Sen. Cranston).
117. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
118. The Senate passed S. 3203 on May 7, 1974 and the House passed H.R. 13,678 on May
30, 1974. King, supra note 108, at 157-58. However, because the House version passed with two
amendments not contained in S. 3203, a conference committee was formed to resolve the differ-
ences between the two bills. Id. at 158. The House and Senate each adopted.the conference report.
Id. at 159. The conference committee approved the two amendments. The first amendment cre-
ated a provision that permits individuals with religious convictions to refrain from joining or finan-
cially supporting any labor organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1988). The second amendment
created an "emergency disputes" provision, which would be available if the Director of the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service decided that a dispute would "substantially interrupt the
delivery of health care in the locality concerned." 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1988). The director is
authorized in such circumstances to appoint a Board of Inquiry to conduct fact-finding and make
recommendations for settling the dispute. See id.
119. See LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 412.
120. "The term 'health care institution' shall include any hospital, health maintenance organi-
zation, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care
of sick, infirm, or aged person." 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1988).
121. See id. § 158(d)(A).
122. See id. § 158(d)(B)-(C). For a discussion of FMCS mediation procedures, see Horvitz &
Moffett, The FMCS and the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes, in HEALTH CARE LABOR LAW 146
(I. Shepard & A. Doudera eds. 1981). See generally Broff, Using Mediation in the Health Care
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tions, a new section was added. Section 8(g)," 3 the added section, required
labor organizations to provide ten days notice to both the FMCS and the
health care institution prior to "engaging [in] any strike, picketing, or other
concerted refusal to work. ' 124 Language restricting the number of bargaining
units in health care institutions, however, was conspicuously absent from the
Health Care Amendments.
12
5
2. The "Congressional Admonition" Against Bargaining Unit Proliferation
a. Language in the Senate Report
Despite the efforts of Senator Taft and the hospital industry, Congress did
not place a statutory limit on the number of bargaining units in health care
institutions. The House and Senate committee reports accompanying the legis-
lation devoted only two sentences to the issue.
The first statement is commonly referred to as the "congressional admoni-
tion" against bargaining unit proliferation.' 26 This first sentence provides:
"Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry.' 27 The committee reports did
not, however, define either "due consideration" or "proliferation," nor did they
describe the manner in which the Board should strive to prevent proliferation.
The reports, however, included a second sentence, 28 which noted the com-
mittees' approval of three Board decisions involving unit determinations at
proprietary hospitals and nursing homes.'2 9 In the first decision listed, Four
Industry, in HEALTH CARE LABOR LAW 152 (I. Shepard & A. Doudera eds. 1981) (discussing the
NLRA's "special provisions for dispute resolution within the health care industry").
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1988).
124. Id.
125. See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152,
158, 169, 183 (1988)).
126. Senator Williams used the word "admonition" to describe the committee report language:
"the committee clearly intends that the Board give due consideration to its admonition to avoid an
undue proliferation of units in the health care industry .... " 120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974),
reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 363 (statement of Sen. Williams). An "admonition"
means a "gentle or friendly reproof, warning or reminder." WEBSTER'S NEW THIRD INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 28 (1981). "Proliferation" means "to increase in number as if by prolifera-
tion." Id. at 1814. Synonyms for "proliferate" include "burgeon," "expand," "multiply," and
"spread." Id.
127. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at
12; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57,
at 274-75.
128. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974) reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at
12; H. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at
274-75.
129. The reports noted the committees' approval of the following Board decisions: Four Seasons
Nursing Center, 208 N.L.R.B. 403 (1974); Woodland Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973);
Extendicare of W. Va., 203 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1973).
The committees qualified their approval of Extendicare in a single footnote: "By our reference
to Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve of all of the holdings of that decision." S. REP. No.
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Seasons Nursing Center,130 the NLRB dismissed a petition for a unit of two
maintenance employees who performed unskilled work."' In the second deci-
sion listed, Woodland Park Hospital,132 the Board overruled a decision by a
regional director which granted X-ray technicians a separate unit . 38 Although
the House and Senate committees merely cited Four Seasons and Woodland
Park, the committees voiced approval of "the trend toward broader units
enunciated" in the third decision listed, Extendicare.'34
In Extendicare, the union sought to represent three separate units of em-
ployees: licensed practical nurses ("LPNs"), technical employees, and service
and maintenance employees."' The Board directed elections in only two units:
one unit consisted of the service, maintenance, and technical employees, and
the other one consisted of the LPNs.'3 The Board directed an election in the
combined unit for two reasons. First, the union was willing to represent a com-
bined unit.'3 7 Second, the Board reasoned that allowing two separate bargain-
ing units when one would be suitable for collective bargaining would create
"unwarranted unit fragmentation," particularly since there were so few tech-
nical employees. 3 Despite these concerns, the Board granted the LPNs a sep-
766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs HIST., supra note 57, at 12 n.l. The House
Report contains language that is slightly different. "By our reference to Extendicare, we do not
necessarily approve of that decision." H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974), re-
printed in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 274-75 n.1. There is no language in the committee
reports that explains the qualified approval of Extendicare.
130. 208 N.L.R.B. 403 (1974).
131. Id. In Four Seasons, the Board overruled a decision of the regional director ordering an
election in a petitioned-for unit consisting of two maintenance employees. Id. In reversing the
regional director, the Board noted that the employees performed light maintenance work that
required relatively little skill. Id. Furthermore, the Board found that the maintenance employees
essentially performed cleaning tasks, which were also common to the housekeeping department.
Id. Accordingly, the Board dismissed their petition for representation as a separate unit. Id.
132. 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973).
133. Id. at 889. In this, a pre-Health Care Amendments case, the NLRB indicated its sensitiv-
ity to the possibility of many small units in the health care industry. The Board suggested that to
find a separate unit of X-ray technicians might increase the probability of "severe fragmentation
of units in the health care industry." Id. Despite this holding, the NLRB did not explain why
"fragmentation" was undesirable, nor did it explain how this decision might increase
fragmentation.
The Board explained that establishing a separate unit of X-ray technicians would lead to "se-
vere fragmentation" of units in the health care industry, particularly since these employees did not
have a distinct community of interest apart from other technical employees. Id. The Board an-
nounced that it was overruling its prior decision in Ochsner Clinic, 192 N.L.R.B. 1059 (1972),
which held that a unit of radiologic technicians was appropriate. Woodland Park, 205 N.L.R.B.
at 889 n.5.
134. 203 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1973).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1233.
138. Id. Extendicare, like Woodland Park, is noteworthy because the Board raised the issue of
"severe" or "unwarranted unit fragmentation" without explaining what fragmentation is or why
the Board found it undesirable in the health care industry. Member Kennedy, dissenting in Ex-
tendicare, came closest to explaining fragmentation. Explaining that he would have directed an
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Commentators have suggested that the committees' qualified approval of
Extendicare referred to their disapproval of the Board's decision to grant the
LPNs a separate unit.' This suggestion is consistent with the committee's
desire to prevent bargaining unit proliferation.""'
While these cases have frequently been used to discern congressional intent
regarding the bargaining unit issue,"" they do not explain fully Congress' con-
cerns surrounding bargaining unit proliferation. Those concerns are expressed
in the contemporary congressional debates.
b. Congressional debates surrounding the committee report's language
Despite the language of the report indicating the committees' desire to pre-
vent bargaining unit proliferation, few congressmen addressed the issue.'
election in the overall employee unit, Kennedy could discern no purpose served by granting the
LPNs a separate unit. Id. at 1234. He believed "that the fragmentation of the comprehensive unit
into two separate units . . . would serve only to impede collective bargaining." Id.
139. Id. at 1232-33.
140. See, e.g., King, supra note 108, at 155 n.27 (stating that "it was agreed by the parties
supporting the legislation that a separate bargaining unit of LPNs was not appropriate. That is
what is meant by the footnote in the Committee Report in the section discussing bargaining
units").
141. See, e.g., Bumpass, supra note 11, at 888 (stating that disapproval of the separate LPN
unit would be consistent with the admonition to prevent bargaining unit proliferation). But see
Fanning, The Health Care Amendments, supra note 104, at 209 (stressing that commentators err
where they construe the committees' qualified approval of Extendicare as disapproval of the deci-
sion). The only contemporary reference to the qualified approval of Extendicare occurred when
Senator Taft explained during the floor debates that "part of the unit findings in that case...
was overly broad and not consistent with minimization of the number of bargaining units in health
care institutions." 120 CONG. REC. 13,559-60 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at
255.
One commentator has suggested that the committees carefully selected these cases to reflect the
unit principles proposed by Senator Taft "without unduly alarming certain labor organizations or
professional associations." King, supra note 108, at 155; cf. Fanning, The Course of Health Care
Decisions: Navigating in Charted Waters, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
ON HOSPITALS & HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS &
THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 56-59 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) (asserting the unit principles in the Taft
bill were not adopted by the committee reports because they were deemed too inflexible) [herein-
after Fanning, The Course of Health Care Decisions].
142. See Mills v. United States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1069 (1984) (stating that committee reports are generally "the most persuasive indicia of Con-
gressional intent (with the exception, of course, of the statute itself)"); see also Bumpass, supra
note. 11l, at 886-92 (describing congressional approval of the cases cited accompanying the "ad-
monition"). It is noteworthy that the cases cited do not refer to units consisting of professional
employees, business clerical employees, skilled maintenance employees, or guards.
143. Only Senator Dominick, an opponent of the legislation, objected to the committee report's
language regarding bargaining units. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1974), re-
printed in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 51-52. Senator Dominick stressed that the proliferation
of bargaining units posed such a great threat to patient care that hospitals needed specific statu-
tory language to limit the number of bargaining units. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45,
reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 52. The Senator represented Colorado, a western rural
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Senator Taft, who earlier proposed such a limit, abandoned the statutory ap-
proach and supported the committee report's language admonishing the Board
to prevent bargaining unit proliferation.""' Senator Taft feared that prolifera-
tion would lead to wage "leapfrogging""4  and "whipsawing, '1 46 thereby in-
creasing health care costs.1" 7 Even after urging the Board to exercise caution
and consider the public interest in making unit decisions, however, the Senator
agreed that the Board should be left with flexibility to make unit decisions for
health care institutions. 48
In this ongoing debate, Senator Williams represented the opposite views of
Senator Taft regarding bargaining unit proliferation. Senator Williams em-
phasized that the Board had already shown "good judgment" in making unit
decisions in "newly covered industries."' 49 The Senator recognized the need
for the Board to give "due consideration" to preventing undue unit prolifera-
tion. "' Nevertheless, he further urged the Board to "use extreme caution not
state, and was particularly concerned that small units of hospital employees could strike and shut
down an entire facility, which would decrease access to health care.
144. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,944-45 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 113-
14. He explained that the health care industry was particularly vulnerable to labor unrest: "If
each professional interest and job classification is permitted to form a separate bargaining unit,
numerous . . labor relations problems become involved in the delivery of health care." 120
CONG. REC. 12,944-45 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 113.
Senator Taft specifically referred to labor relations problems stemming from unit fragmentation
in the construction industry and urged that the health care industry "must not be permitted to go
the route of other industries, particularly the construction trades." 120 CONG. REC. 12,944-45
(1974), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 114.
145. "Leapfrogging" occurs in situations in which an employer bargains separately with several
unions and signs a separate agreement with each union. See H. ROBERTS, ROBERT'S DICTIONARY
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 380 (3d ed. 1986). When the last union negotiates it may decide to
break any pattern set between the employer and the other unions, applying economic pressure if
necessary. Id. If the employer agrees to the hold-out union's demands, "the hold-out union has
thus leap-frogged over the agreement pattern already set by the other unions, and the other unions
leap-frog when they insist upon parity of treatment with the original hold-out union." Id.
146. "Whipsawing" is a strategy whereby employees try to negotiate a wage rate with one
employer and then use that rate as "a pattern or base to obtain the same or greater benefits from
other employers, under the threat of pressure (including a strike) used against the first employer."
Id. at 781.
147. Senator Taft also emphasized that the committee report represented "agreed upon" lan-
guage, which stressed the need to "reduce and limit" the number of bargaining units in health
care institutions. 120 CONG. REC. 12,944-45 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at
113. Despite these concerns, however, Senator Taft abandoned the statutory limit.
148. Id.
149. 120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 362-63.
150. See 120 CONG. REc. 22,575 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 363.
Senator Williams emphasized that he expected the Board to act on behalf of the public interest
when "exercising its specialized experience and expert knowledge in determining appropriate bar-
gaining units." Id. He noted that the Board had, "as a rule, tended to avoid an unnecessary
proliferation of collective bargaining utiits, sometimes circumstances require that there be a numi-
ber of bargaining units among nonsupervisory employees, particularly where there is such a his-
tory in the area or a notable disparity of interests between employees in different job classifica-
tions." Id.
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to read into this act by implication-or general logical reasoning-something
that is not contained in the bill, its report and the explanation thereof."''
Only two other congressmen, John Ashbrook and Frank Thompson, Jr., ad-
dressed the bargaining unit issue. The decisions cited in the committee reports
were chosen to show that the Board had acted in a "congressionally approved
manner." 2 Like Senator Williams, Representative Ashbrook expressed confi-
dence that the Board would balance patient care needs and employee rights in
its unit decisions. " ' Agreeing with Ashbrook, Representative Thompson added
that the committee reports did not intend to "foreclose the Board from contin-
uing to determine traditional craft and departmental units . . . in the health
care field." 1 4 Representative Thompson was the last congressman to contem-
poraneously comment on the bargaining unit issue. Shortly thereafter, the
Health Care Amendments became effective. 6 As a result, the Board was soon
overwhelmed with representation petitions from employees seeking elections to
choose collective bargaining representatives.6 Soon after these developments,
the NLRB made its first decisions for the industry.
C. NLRB Health Care Unit Decisions: 1975-1982
1. The "Community of Interests" Test For Unit Determinations
The Act provides little guidance to the Board in selecting an appropriate
bargaining unit.' The Act does not require "the unit for bargaining be the
151. 120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 361. Senator
Williams encouraged the Board to remember that the legislation was the "product of compro-
mise." Id.
152. 120 CONG. REC. 22,949 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at 411.
153. See id.
154. 120 CONG. REc. 22,948 (1974). Commentators have observed that Representative Thomp-
son's statement was inserted into the record eleven days after the House adopted the conference
report on the Health Care Amendments. Thus, this statement is "post-passage" commentary,
which is of dubious value in construing congressional intent. See Bumpass, supra note 111, at 874
nn. 35-36 (citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1977) (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)); King, supra note 108, at 159 n.47, 160 (discussing the Board's adherence to the post-
passage statement).
155. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
156. Pepe, Legal Framework of the NLRA Amendments: An Overview of the Changes and
Their Significance, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON HOSPITALS &
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 8
(A. Knapp ed. 1977).
157. Section 9(b) requires that the Board "shall decide, in each case whether in order to assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof. ... 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988). Section 9(b)(l) prohibits a unit
consisting of professionals and nonprofessionals unless a majority of the professionals first vote to
agree to join the combined unit. See id. § 159(b)(1). Section 9(b)(2) permits craft units to sever
themselves from larger units. See id. § 159(b)(2). Section 9(b)(3) requires that any unit of guards
must consist exclusively of guards, because of the inherent conflict of interest guards would face in
a mixed unit in the event of a strike, work stoppage, or other job action. See id. § 159(b)(3).
The only other statutory guideline regarding unit determinations is found in § 9(c)(5)(b) which
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only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most appropriate unit; the
Act requires only that the unit be 'appropriate.' It must be appropriate to
ensure to employees, in each case, 'the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this Act.'-"I"
The NLRB developed a "community of interests" test in order to serve two
purposes: to identify groupings of employees who shared comhnon interests and
attributes; and, to balance the employees' need for effective representation
with the need to select a unit which would not undermine the collective bar-
gaining process. 15 9 In determining whether employees share a sufficient com-
munity of interests to comprise an appropriate bargaining unit, the Board
looks to factors such as wages, hours, skills, qualifications, working conditions,
functional integration, supervision, interchange of employees, physical proxim-
ity, and history of organizing.16 The Board's selection of an appropriate unit
vitally affects labor's strategy in organizing drives.' 6' Organized labor and
health care industry management, therefore, earnestly awaited the NLRB's
first line of decisions for the industry.16 2
2. The Mercy Hospitals Line of Cases
When the NLRB issued its lead unit determination cases, on May 5, 1975,
health care employers and labor unions received guidance on what types of
units would be found appropriate in the industry. 3 In Mercy Hospitals of
states that for "determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes [of collective bargain-
ing] ... the extent to which employees have organized shall not be controlling." Id. §
159(c)(5)(b).
158. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
in original), enforced, 190 F.2d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1951).
159. See. e.g., Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962) (holding that the
Board must balance employees' desires for organization and collective expression with the need to
create a climate in which collective bargaining will flourish).
160. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961) (holding that an appro-
priate unit consists of employees "whose similarity of function and skills create a community of
interest such as would warrant separate representation"); 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1951) (stating
that "the Board's primary concern is to group together only [those] employees who have substan-
tial mutual interests in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment").
For a complete discussion of the history, application, and critique of the "community of inter-
ests" concept, see ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 11-83, 339-43.
161. See ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 284. For a discussion of the importance of the unit
determination to labor-management relations, see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Fanning, The Health Care Amendments, supra note 104, at 201 (referring to
the strong interest in "the initial and long-awaited Board unit" decisions).
163. Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979) (holding that
registered nurses, all other professionals, business office clerical employees, and service and main-
tenance employees are entitled to separate units); Nathan & Miriam Barnert Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 775 (1975) (holding that technical employees warrant a separate unit); St.
Catherine's Hosp. of Dominican Sisters, 217 N.L.R.B. 787 (1975) (holding that a separate unit of
LPNs is not appropriate); Newington Children's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 793 (1975) (holding that a
service and maintenance employees unit excluding technical employees is appropriate); Sisters of
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Sacramento Inc.,16" the NLRB addressed its authority to make unit determi-
nations and acknowledged the "congressional admonition" to avoid undue unit
proliferation.' The Board then applied its traditional "community of inter-
ests" test. 6 ' In doing so, the Board relied on congressional remarks that the
Board had the authority to determine appropriate bargaining units.' 6' The
Board found four units to be appropriate: registered nurses,' 68 all other profes-
sional employees, 6 9 service and maintenance employees," 0 and business cleri-
cal employees. 7
Additionally, the Board also expressed its position on union organizing by
professional employees in Mercy Hospitals."12 It rejected a regional director's
decision to include registered nurses within a unit of professionals because
nurses shared "a greater degree of separateness" than most other profession-
als. 71 The nature of nurses' duties and a "singular history of separate repre-
sentation and collective bargaining," entitled nurses to a separate unit. 74 This
decision stands for the proposition that representation petitions for units con-
sisting solely of registered nurses are per se appropriate." The Board, how-
ever, dismissed a petition for a separate unit of laboratory medical technolo-
St. Joseph of Peace, 217 N.L.R.B. 797 (1975) (holding that a unit of business office clerical
employees is appropriate); Duke Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799 (1975) (holding that a separate unit of
switchboard telephone operators is not appropriate); Mount Airy Found., 217 N.L.R.B. 802
(1975) (holding that an all-technical employee unit is appropriate when sought); Shriners Hosp.
for Crippled Children, 217 N.L.R.B. 806 (1975) (holding that a separate unit of licensed station-
ary engineers is not appropriate).
164. 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975), enforcement denied on other grounds, 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.
1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
165. Id. at 766.
166. See id. at 767.
167. See id. at 766, 767 n.10 (citing 120 CONG. REc. 12,104 (1974)). Senator Williams re-
marked that "the committee . . . did not within this framework intend to preclude the Board
acting in the public interest from exercising its specialized experience and expert knowledge in
determining appropriate bargaining units." 120 CONG. REC. 12,104 (1974).
168. Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 768 (1975).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 769.
171. Id. at 770. The Board followed its approach to granting a separate unit of business office
clericals in the industrial sector because the community of interests of "business office clerical
employees differ markedly from the interests of [other] clerical employees." Id. (citing General
Elec. Co. (River Works), 107 N.L.R.B. 70 (1953)). The Board found that granting business office
clericals a separate unit did not conflict with the "congressional admonition" about unit prolifera-
tion because "Congress recognized the possible appropriateness of separate bargaining units
among employees who have a history of separate representation." Id. at 770. To comply with the
"congressional admonition," the Board indicated that all other clerical employees would not be
entitled to a separate unit, but should be included within a unit of service and maintenance em-
ployees. See id.
172. See id. at 766-69.
173. Id. at 767.
174. Id.
175. See id.
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gists. 176 In deciding Mercy Hospitals, the Board referred to Senator Taft's
remarks that adverse effects might occur if each professional classification
were allowed to form a separate unit. 17 7 The Board stated that a unit consist-
ing of all professionals, excluding registered nurses, was the only other profes-
sional unit it would find appropriate. 178 The Board explained that to find oth-
erwise might result in an "undue proliferation of bargaining units. 1 9
In Nathan & Miriam Barnert Memorial Hospital Association, the Board
confronted the issue of granting a separate unit for technical employees.' 80
The Board majority held that a unit consisting of all technical employees was
appropriate. 18 ' The majority stated that such a unit did not contravene the
"congressional admonition" against bargaining unit proliferation. 82
The Board, however, indicated its disapproval of smaller, more specialized
units by rejecting petitions for separate units of licensed stationary engi-
neers' 83 and telephone operators. 84 The dissenters asserted that the committee
report language approving of Extendicare demonstrated a congressional intent
favoring broader units.18  The dissent would have combined the technical em-
ployees with the service and maintenance employees and directed an election
in that unit. 88
3. The NLRB Unit Decisions Following Mercy Hospitals
The NLRB generally followed the five-unit structure outlined by the Mercy
176. Id. at 769.
177. Id. at 768.
178. Id. at 768-69.
179. Id. at 769 (emphasis in original).
180. 217 N.L.R.B. 775 (1975).
181. Id. at 777.
182. Id. The Board also noted that even the most restrictive proposal to limit bargaining units,
Senator Taft's proposal, would have found a technical unit to be appropriate. Id. at 77 n.25; see
also Newington Children's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 793, 795 (1975) (finding that technical employ-
ees warrant a unit separate and apart from service and maintenance employees); Mount Airy
Found., 217 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 n.2 (1975) (holding that it is a Board policy to place all technical
employees in a technical unit when sought).
183. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 808 (1975). The Board was
sharply divided as the majority, Members Penello, Kennedy, and Jenkins, found the unit was
inappropriate. Kennedy and Penello believed that the legislative history of the Health Care
Amendments precluded a finding of a separate unit. See id. The dissenters, Chairman Murphy
and Member Fanning, relied on Representative Thompson's remarks that the committees did not
intend to foreclose the Board from granting separate units of stationary engineers and would have
found the unit to be appropriate. See id. at 809-10 (Murphy, Chairman, and Fanning, Member,
dissenting in part). Member Jenkins was the swing vote. He joined Kennedy and Penello in the
result but declined to follow their reasoning. He found that, under the facts, the petitioned-for
unit did not share a significant community of interest to warrant separate representation. Id. at
809 (Jenkins, Member, concurring).
184. Duke Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799, 800 (1975).
185. Nathan & Miriam Barnert Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 784-86 (1975)
(Kennedy & Penello, Members, dissenting).
186. Id.
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Hospitals line of cases: nurses, all other professional employees, technical em-
ployees, business clerical employees, and service and maintenance employees.
In a more recent case, however, the Board departed from the five-unit struc-
ture by adding two units: physicians and skilled maintenance employees. In
Ohio Valley Hospital Association,'87 the Board announced that physicians oc-
cupy a unique role within the industry. 88 The Board reasoned that physicians
deserve this separate unit because physicians represent "a class unto them-
selves," and thus, warrant a separate unit.8 9 The Board's second departure
from the five-unit structure involves separate units for skilled maintenance em-
ployees. In Jewish Hospital of Cincinnati,90 a unanimous Board agreed that a
skilled maintenance unit was appropriate and consistent with the "congres-
sional admonition," provided the employees had a sufficient community of in-
terest to warrant separate representation. 191 On the particular facts of this
case, however, the Board dismissed the petition.' 92
The issue of separate maintenance units has frequently divided the Board,
with different results occurring in cases that share similar facts.' 93 One com-
mentator suggested that the inconsistency can be partly explained by the com-
position of the Board.' 9 4 Some members stressed that the "congressional ad-
monition" precluded separate units for skilled maintenance employees, but
others disagreed with this view.' 95 Since decisions frequently turned on the
vote of one member, the Board's position on approving skilled employee main-
tenance units has been inconsistent. 96
In order to comply with the "congressional admonition," the Board rarely
granted petitions for units other than those outlined above. The exception to
187. 230 N.L.R.B. 604 (1977).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 605.
190. 223 N.L.R.B. 614 (1976). One commentator has suggested that the Board's five-unit
structure is misleading. See King, supra note 108, at 163 n.68 (noting that the Board has permit-
ted units of guards, boiler operators, pre-existing bargaining units, stipulated units, and has
granted comity to state unit decisions, thereby creating " 'double digit' unit proliferation") (cita-
tions omitted).
191. Jewish Hospital, 223 N.L.R.B. at 616.
192. Id. at 617.
193. See, e.g., Emmanuel, Hospital Bargaining Unit Decisions, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON HOSPITALS & HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, LABOR RELATIONS LAW
PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS & THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 200-02 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) (stating
that hospital management attorney was unable to discern any significant factual difference be-
tween those Board cases finding maintenance units appropriate and those that do not); D'Alba,
Health Care Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board Since the 1974 Amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON
HOSPITALS & HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS & THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 15, 42-43 (pointing out that five Board decisions with different outcomes
in maintenance units yet "the facts ... are basically the same").
194. See ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 263-64. For a discussion of the composition of Board
membership and its impact on Board decisions, see Gregory, supra note 28, at 41-42.
195. ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 261-65.
196. Id. at 263-64 (comparing Board maintenance unit decisions with Board voting patterns).
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this rule is when the employer and the union agree to a particular unit. 197 The
Board refused to grant separate units for professional employees such as phar-
macists,1"8 medical laboratory technologists,' 99 and intern and resident physi-
cians.'00 In addition, the Board refused to grant a residual unit for nonprofes-
sional employees.2°0
The Board's unit decisions affected both the available choices to labor in
organizing workers in the industry and hospital management's response to
such organization.' 20 Board decisions encouraged industrial unions to organize
larger units and discouraged the organization of smaller, more specialized un-
ions.' 03 Health care employers'also opposed the Board's decisions because the
decisions, from their perspective, did not adhere to the "congressional admoni-
tion.' 2 4 As a result, employers often challenged unfavorable decisions in the
federal courts of appeals.
20 5
197. Otis Hosp. Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 164 (1975). The Board announced that its policy to honor
stipulations by the parties to an appropriate unit was consistent with the legislative history regard-
ing unit proliferation, noting that even Senator Taft's proposal would have allowed stipulation
agreements. Id. at 164-65.
The Board has granted, "under extreme facts," a unit of boiler operators. See Emmanuel, supra
note 193, at 191 n.21 (citing St. Vincent's Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 638 (1976), enforcement denied,
567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977)). The proposed unit in St. Vincent's Hospital was made up of
four boiler operators who were licensed, highly skilled, geographically set apart employees. 223
N.L.R.B. at 638. These boiler operators had minimal contact and no interchange with all other
employees. Id. The board, therefore, granted the boiler operators a separate unit. Id.
The Board has also granted a unit of chauffeurs-drivers. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center,
242 N.L.R.B. 322, 323 (1979).
198. See National Medical Convalescent Home, 254 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1358 (1981) (holding that.
a pharmacist unit is not appropriate); San Jose Hosp. & Health Center, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 21, 22
(1977); Kaiser Found. Hosps., 219 N.L.R.B. 325, 326 (1975); Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric
Center, 219 N.L.R.B. 520, 520 (1975).
199. See Missouri Pac. Employers Hosp. Ass'n, 251 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1548 (1980) (holding that
medical laboratory technologist unit is not appropriate).
200. See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976). The NLRB rejected a sepa-
rate unit of these physicians not because they found it was inconsistent with the "congressional
admonition," but because intern and resident physicians were students and not "employees"
within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 251.
201. See Levine Hosp. of Hayward, 219 N.L.R.B. 327 (1975). The Board held that to grant
such a unit would contravene the "congressional admonition" against proliferation. Id. at 328.
202. See ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 284-88 (stating that unit determinations have great im-
pact on health care unionization and management's countermeasures).
203. Id. at 284, 288.
204. See, e.g., Emmanuel, supra note 193, at 190-91 (stressing that the Board decisions had
"created unit proliferation" in the industry); cf Fanning, Health Care Labor Relations: Problems
and Predictions, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON HOSPITALS &
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS & THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY 240-45 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) (contending thpt part of management's opposition is
also designed to create delay in the representation process and undermine the support of the union
before the election occurs) [hereinafter Fanning, Health Care Labor Relations].
205. Section 10(f) of the Act permits persons "aggrieved by a final order" of the Board to seek
judicial review in the federal courts of appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1988). Employers cannot
obtain direct judicial review of Board orders in representation cases because they are not "final
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D. The Courts of Appeals and the Board
1. "Community of Interests" and the "Congressional Admonition" Against
Bargaining Unit Proliferation
The central issue between the NLRB and the federal courts of appeals in
health care unit decisions has been the Board's compliance with the "congres-
sional admonition" against bargaining unit proliferation. 06 Determinations of
the appropriate standard of judicial review and the Board's apparent disregard
for judicial precedent have caused the relationship between the NLRB and the
courts of appeals to become strained." Federal courts traditionally deferred
to the NLRB's unit decisions, which are "rarely to be disturbed,"2 8 unless the
Board's decision amounts to an abuse of discretion.20 9 Nevertheless, federal
orders" within the meaning of § 10(f). AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409-11 (1940). Congress did
not authorize direct judicial review of representational issues because it believed that direct judi-
cial review of Board orders in representation cases would frustrate the national labor policy of
fostering collective bargaining. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that congressional intent is "firmly against direct review . . . because of the
risk that time-consuming review might defeat the objectives of the national labor policy").
Although employers are barred from obtaining direct review of unit decisions, they may still
obtain review by committing an unfair .labor practice, typically by refusing to bargain with the
certified union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). If the union files a § 8(a)(5) charge because
the employer has refused to bargain, the regional director must investigate and, if he finds that the
charge is well founded, he will issue a complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1989). The General
Counsel will then move for summary judgment. In the absence of any new evidence, the Board
will grant the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment because the party is not entitled
to relitigate issues that were or could have been litigated in the previous representation proceed-
ing. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (1989). The Board will then order the employer to bargain with
the union. Upon the Board's order, the employer becomes a "person aggrieved" by a "final order"
in an unfair labor practice proceeding. See 29 U.S.C. § 160() (1988). Any questions concerning
the underlying representational issues, that is, the unit determination, may be raised in the unfair
labor practice proceedings. Section 9(d) requires that the record in the representation case must
be certified, to the federal court of appeals hearing the unfair labor practice case. Id. § 159(d).
"Persons aggrieved" may petition for review of the Board's order in the circuit court of appeals
where the unfair labor practice occurred, where the person resides or transacts business, or in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 160().
Section 10(e) authorizes the Board to seek enforcement of its orders in the court of appeals
where the unfair labor practice arose or where the person resides or does business. Id. § 160(e).
206. See. e.g., ABODEELY, supra note 45, at 265-76 (discussing the differing Board and court
perspectives on the "congressional admonition").
207. Zimmerman & Dunn, Relations Between the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals: A Tale
of Acrimony and Accommodation, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 4, 5 (1982). The authors observed that
part of the tension between the Board and the judiciary may be attributable to their differences in
jurisdiction: "The courts of appeals have limited geographic jurisdiction, while the Board holds a
nationwide charter. Thus, the Board often refuses to acquiesce when one or more of the circuit
courts disagrees with its interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. This practice has led
to harsh criticism of the Board ... ." Id.
208. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947). "The issue as to what unit is
appropriate for bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and
none should be by decision. It involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion and the
decision of the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed."- Id.
209. Id.
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courts have deferred less to Board decisions in the health care industry.210
The Third Circuit was the one of the first courts of appeals to address a
Board unit determination in the health care industry. In Memorial Hospital v.
NLRB, 211 the court refused to enforce a Board order directing the hospital to
bargain with a unit of maintenance department employees.212 The court held
that the Board should not have granted comity to a previous state labor board
decision certifying the unit. 28 The court reasoned that the "congressional ad-
monition" against proliferation of bargaining units required the NLRB to
make its own unit determination; it could not simply rely on the pre-amend-
ments decision of a state labor relations agency.2 4 The Third Circuit again
reviewed the meaning of the "congressional admonition" in St. Vincent's Hos-
pital215 and denied enforcement of a Board order which required a hospital to
bargain with a certified unit of boiler operators.21 6 After reviewing the legisla-
tive history, the court decided that the Board's use of the "community of inter-
ests" test did not "comply with congressional intent to treat this unique field in
a special manner. "217
Following St. Vincent's Hospital, the Board reviewed and restated its unit
determination standards.21 ' In Allegheny General Hospital,"9 the Board re-
sponded to the Third Circuit's criticisms.2 ' The Board emphasized that Con-
gress had not amended section 9(b) of the Act, which left unit determinations
to the expertise of the Board. 221 The Board asserted that Congress did not
expect it to depart from its traditional "community of interest" criteria. 222
Had Congress intended the NLRB to abandon traditional criteria, "it could
210. Compare Zimmerman & Dunn, supra note 207, at 5, 13 (stating that courts are "quick to
substitute their own factual findings and legal judgment for that of [the Board]") with Curley,
Health Care Unit Determinations: The Board Ignores the Mandate of Congress and the Courts
of Appeals, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 103 (1984) (stating that courts must be vigilant to make sure
the Board does not abuse its discretion in making unit decisions).
211. 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976).
212. Id. at 362.
213. Id. By granting comity, the Board had deferred to the pre-Health Care Amendments deci-
sion of a state labor relations agency that had certified a maintenance unit. Id. at 353-54.
214. Id. at 361-62. The court remanded the case to the Board to make its own unit determina-
tion. Id. at 362.
215. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
216. Id. at 593.
217. Id. at 592. The court observed that "[p]roliferation of units in industrial settings has not
been the subject of congressional attention but fragmentation in the health care field has aroused
legislative apprehension. The Board therefore should recognize that the contours of a bargaining
unit in other industries do not follow the blueprint Congress desired in a hospital." Id.
218. See Allegheny General Hosp. ("Allegheny II"), 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (1978) .
219. Id. In Allegheny 1I the Board reaffirmed its previous decision in an earlier proceeding of
the same case. Allegheny General Hosp.. ("Allegheny 1"), 230 N.L.R.B. 954 (1976). In Allegheny
I, the Board granted comity to a certification issued by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
that a unit of maintenance employees was an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. Id. at 956.
220. See Allegheny H, 239 N.L.R.B. at 872.
221. Id. at 872-73.
222. Id. at 873.
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have easily amended Section 9(b) to so provide."22 The Board conducted its
own review of the legislative history and concluded that Congress was primar-
ily concerned that unit proliferation in the health care industry not follow the
pattern established in the construction industry. 24 The Board majority stated
that it must "respectfully disagree" with the court's holdings in Memorial
Hospital and St. Vincent's Hospital.2" The NLRB, therefore, affirmed its de-
cision to extend comity to a state labor relations board decision finding a unit
of maintenance employees to be appropriate.2 26
The Third Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in Allegheny Gen-
eral Hospital v. NLRB. 227 Criticizing the Board, the court held that merely
applying traditional "community of interest" criteria did not fulfill the Board's
duty to consider the public interest in preventing bargaining unit prolifera-
tion. 28 The court rebuked the Board for refusing to abide by the court's anal-
ysis in St. Vincent's Hospital when it addressed the need to prevent
proliferation. 2 9
The Board soon confronted criticism in other circuits, particularly in cases
involving maintenance employees and registered nurses. Following the lead of
the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit refused to enforce Board orders to bar-
gain with certified units of maintenance employees.280 The court agreed with
the Board that the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments did not
preclude separate maintenance units.22' The court, however, also stated that
Board decisions involving maintenance employees were in "disarray."2 2 The
court rejected the Board's assertion that the "congressional admonition" was
aimed at preventing each health care job classification from developing sepa-
rate units and avoiding the pattern of organization in the construction indus-
try."' Instead, the court stressed that Congress wanted the Board to avoid the
223. Id.
224. Id. at 874-75.
225. Id. at 872-73.
226. Id. at 879.
227. 608 F.2d 965, 971 (3d Cir. 1979).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 970. The court stated, "for the Board to predicate an order on its disagreement with
this court's interpretation of a statute is for it to operate outside the law. Such an order will not be
enforced." Id.
230. NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a unit of
maintenance employees is not appropriate), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 (1980); Long Island Col-
lege Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833, 846 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the Board may not grant
comity to a state labor relations agency's finding that a unit of maintenance employees was appro-
priate), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
231. Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F,.2d 833, 844 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 996 (1978).
232. Id. at 844.
233. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d at 27. The construction industry has historically consisted of
employees who have organized into units according to specific craft skills, such as plumbers, elec-
tricians, carpenters, and other job functions. "If the pattern of the construction industry were used
as a model for the health care industry, health care employees would be grouped into units ac-
cording to 'each professional interest and job classification.' " Allegheny II, 239 N.L.R.B. 872,
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"egregious" unit proliferation found in the construction trades, as well as less
extreme forms of unit fragmentation.23 The court instructed the Board to bal-
ance its traditional "community of interest" analysis with the public's interest
in preventing fragmentation in the health care field.235
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of Board orders directing
hospitals to bargain with certified units of licensed stationary engineers23 and
maintenance employees. 3 7 In Mary Thompson Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 218 the
Seventh Circuit criticized the Board for paying "mere lip-service" to the
"[c]ongressional admonition."23 9 The court claimed that the Board failed to
specify how, or in what manner, the decision reflected the congressional direc-
tive.240 The Seventh Circuit rebuked the Board for failing to follow precedent,
stating that the "flagrant disregard of judicial precedent must not con-
tinue."2 1 The appellate court also denied enforcement of a Board bargaining
order directing a hospital to bargain with a unit of four licensed stationary
engineers.2 42 Chief Judge Fairchild dissented, emphasizing that because the
"admonition" was not a part of the statute, it was not helpful in interpreting
the Board's purported abuse of discretion.243 Fairchild reasoned that Section
9(b), which covers unit determinations, had not been changed, 24' and there-
fore, was the authority for unit determinations.2 4 5
Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit joined the emerging pattern of court criti-
cism by refusing to enforce a Board bargaining order with a unit of registered
nurses.2"' The NLRB's unit decisions fared better in the First, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits. The First Circuit enforced a Board order which directed the
employer to bargain with a unit consisting of all professional employees. 241
875 (1978) (emphasis in original). The Board believed that it was this pattern that Congress had
in mind when the committees issued their report language regarding bargaining unit proliferation.
Id.
234. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d at 27.
235. Id. (quoting St. Vincent's Hosp. v NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977)).
236. Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980).
237. NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
238. 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980).
239. Id. at 863.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 864.
242. Id. at 859.
243. Id. at 864.
244. Id. Judge Fairchild indicated that the "admonition" might serve a political purpose: the
Board might be "courting a statutory change" if it failed to comply with the "admonition." Id.
Even so, Judge Fairchild stressed that it was not proper for courts to use the "admonition" in
analyzing the Board's purported "abuse of discretion." Id.; see also Cooper & Brent, The Nursing
Profession & the Right to Separate Representation, 58 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1053, 1070-71 (1982)
(stressing that courts have given too much weight to an admonition that is merely "hortatory" and
has no legal effect).
245. Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980) (Fairchild, C.J.,
dissenting).
246. See NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp., Inc., 691 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1982).
247. See NLRB v, Community Health Servs., Inc., 705 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1983).
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Additionally, the Fifth Circuit upheld a Board order directing a hospital to
bargain with a unit including technical, service, and maintenance employ-
ees.24 8 Finally, the Sixth Circuit upheld Board orders with certified units of
technical employees.24 9 Nevertheless, many of the Board's decisions drew
sharp criticism from the courts of appeals for both applying the traditional
"community of interests" test, and for not heeding the "congressional admoni-
tion" to prevent unit proliferation. Although the courts were critical of the
Board's decisions, they did not provide any specific guidelines except for the
need to consider the public in bargaining unit proliferation.26
2. The "Disparity of Interests" Test
The Ninth Circuit soon provided the Board with a more specific approach to
making unit determinations in the health care industry.2 5 In NLRB v. St.
Francis Hospital,2" 2 the court refused to enforce a Board bargaining order
which directed a hospital to bargain with a unit consisting solely of registered
nurses. 262 On remand, the court instructed the Board to eliminate the focus on
the community of interests among employees.2 54 Instead, the court stressed
that the focus should be "upon the disparity of interests between employee
groups which would prohibit or inhibit fair representation of employees' inter-
ests, [so] a balance [could] be made between the congressional directive and
the employees' right to representation. 2 5 The court took its "disparity of in-
terests" language directly from Senator Williams' remarks during the floor
debates. The court stated that the "disparity of interests" language and the
rest of the legislative history required the Board to apply a "disparity of inter-
ests" approach to unit determinations. 6 In addition, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Board's use of an irrebuttable presumption in favor of registered
nurses' units was inconsistent with the "congressional admonition. 129 7 This
presumption precluded employers from introducing any evidence to rebut the
248. See Vicksburg Hosp., Inc. v NLRB, 653 F.2d 1070, 1073-75 (5th Cir. 1981).
249. See NLRB v. Sweetwater Hosp. Ass'n, 604 F.2d 454, 458 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
technical employee unit is appropriate); Bay Medical Center, Inc., v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th
Cir. 1978) (holding that, based on bargaining history, a technical unit excluding LPNs is appro-
priate), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
250. See supra notes 227-29, 235 and accompanying text.
251. See NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
252. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
253. Id. at 422.
254. Id. at 419.
255. Id.
256. Id. Senator Williams used the words "disparity of interests" following his comment that
the NLRB had generally shown good judgment in making unit decisions in newly covered indus-
tries. He noted that the Board had generally "tended to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of
bargaining units, sometimes circumstances require that there be a number of bargaining units
among nonsupervisory employees, particularly where there is such a history in the area or a nota-
ble disparity of interests between employees in different job classifications." 120 CONG. REC.
22,575 (1974), reprinted in LaGIs. HIsT., supra note 57, at 362-63.
257. NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1979).
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presumption based on individual circumstances surrounding their facilities. 58
The NLRB responded to the Ninth Circuit's criticisms in Newton- Wellesley
Hospital"9 and abandoned its per se policy favoring units consisting solely of
registered nurses. 260 The Board agreed that per se rules could result in inade-
quate attention to the "admonition" by allowing separate units of nurses or
other employees where the circumstances did not warrant it.21 Referring to
the "disparity of interests" analysis, the Board suggested the court's disap-
proval of the "community of interests" analysis "may be largely semantic...
and .. .one of emphasis or degree, and not ... a distinction of kind. '"2 62 An
analysis of the disparity of interests among employees was implicit in the
Board's "community of interests" analysis.2 63 Furthermore, the Board found
no indication in the legislative history that it must abandon the "community of
interests" standard.264 Regarding the specific facts in the case, the Board held
that a unit of registered nurses was appropriate.2 65
The Tenth Circuit soon challenged the Board's position that the "disparity
of interests" standard was simply a difference in semantics.266 In Presbyterian/
St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB,267 the Tenth Circuit refused to enforce a
Board order that required the hospital to bargain with a certified unit of regis-
tered nurses. 268 In addition, the appellate court enunciated its view of the
proper legal standard to be used in making health care unit determinations.269
The court remanded the case to the Board with the following instructions:
"The proper approach is to begin with a broad proposed unit and then exclude
employees with disparate interests. One should not start with a narrow unit,
such as registered nurses, and then add professionals with similar interests." 270
The Tenth Circuit has continued to apply a "disparity of interests" standard
in health care unit cases, 71 and this standard was eventually adopted by the
258. Id. The court stressed that it was not foreclosing the appropriateness of units of registered
nurses, nor the use of presumptions, but that employers must ,be given an opportunity to rebut the
presumptions. Id. at 415-16.
259. 250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980).
260. Id. at 415.
261. Id. at 411.
262. Id. at 411-12.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 412.
265. Id. at 413. The NLRB explained that its "community of interests" analysis also embraced
an analysis of the disparity of interests among employees: "our inquiry ... necessarily proceeds
to a further determination whether the interests of the group sought are sufficiently distinct from
those of other employees to warrant establishment of a separate unit." Id. (footnote omitted).
266. See Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981),
modified sub. nom., Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982).
267. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981), modified sub. nom. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center,'
688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982).
268. Id. at 457-58.
269. Id. at 457 n.6.
270. Id. at 458 n.6.
271. See. e.g., St. Anthony Hosp. Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1989);
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27 2
By 1982, the Board faced constant criticism from the courts of appeals,
which repeatedly denied enforcement of Board bargaining orders, particularly
with units of registered nurses and skilled maintenance employees.2 7 The Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits criticized the Board's approach but
conceded that "community of interests" criteria could be used. This "commu-
nity of interests" approach, however, needed to accommodate the public inter-
est in preventing unit proliferation. Further, these circuits wanted the Board to
demonstrate, and not merely recite, how its decision was consistent with the
"congressional admonition.1 274 A split had emerged within the circuits, how-
ever, as the Ninth and Tenth Circuits were demanding that the Board apply a
new legal standard, the "disparity of interests" test.27' Aware of court criti-
cism, the Board soon revised its approach for determining appropriate bargain-
ing units in the health care industry.
E. The NLRB Responds to the Courts: The St. Francis Trilogy
1. St. Francis I
The Board fully addressed court criticism and the different approaches to
health care unit decisions in St. Francis Hospital ("St. Francis 1').276 In St.
Francis I, the Board reviewed a petition seeking a separate unit of skilled
maintenance employees.177 The Board acknowledged criticism from the courts
of appeals, yet stressed that the legislative history did not suggest any congres-
sional expectation that the Board abandon the "community of interests"
test.278 After reviewing the legislative history and its prior decisions, the Board
concluded that it did not merely apply traditional "community of interest"
criteria. 27 9 Instead, the Board claimed that it adhered to the "congressional
admonition" against unit proliferation.28
Similar to its reasons for sustaining the "community of interests" test, the
Southwest Community Health Servs. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1984); Beth Israel
Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 697
(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982); St. Anthony Hosp. Sys. v. NLRB,
655 F.2d 1028, modified sub. nom Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697
(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982).
272. See NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Cal. Med. Group Health Plan, Inc., 678 F.2d 806, 812 n.17
(9th Cir. 1982). The court stated that "separate bargaining units in the health care field must be
justified in terms of a disparity that precludes combination, not an internal consistency within a
class that could justify separation." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Presbyterian/St.Luke's
Hosp. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 457 n.6 (10th Cir. 1981)),
273. See supra notes 211-17, 227-46, 251-58, 266-72 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 251-58, 266-72 and accompanying text.
276. 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1029.
279. Id. at 1030-31.
280. Id. at 1026-30.
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Board rejected the argument that there was any legislative intent to compel
the "disparity of interests" test adopted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.28" '
Claiming this test was not consistent with the Board's historical approach to
unit determinations, the Board characterized the "disparity of interests" test
as one that would limit it to finding only two appropriate bargaining units:
professionals and nonprofessionals. 82
After rejecting the standards advanced by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
the Board announced a new two-tiered test for unit decisions in the health care
industry.283 The Board identified seven potentially appropriate units: physi-
cians, registered nurses, other professional employees, technical employees,
business office clerical employees, service and maintenance employees, and
maintenance employees.284 If a petition requested a unit that did not fall
within one of those groupings, the Board would, absent extraordinary circum-
stances, dismiss the petition. 85 Where the requested unit fits within one of the
seven groupings, the Board would apply its traditional "community of inter-
ests" test to determine whether the unit was appropriate.28 The Board con-
cluded that this approach better implemented the congressional intent to pre-
vent bargaining unit proliferation.8 7 The "community of interests" test
consisted of two steps: first, a preliminary screening step, and then, application
of the "community of interests" criteria.2 88 Applying its new test to the spe-
cific facts, the Board approved a unit of skilled maintenance employees.289
This decision evoked strong dissents. 29" The dissenters asserted that a "dis-
parity of interests" standard results in fewer units, and thus, better imple-
ments the "congressional admonition" against proliferation. 28' Their approach
created a presumption in favor of two "wall-to-wall" units: professionals and
nonprofessionals. Any other units were appropriate only if the employees seek-
ing the proposed unit had such "a notable disparity of interests from employ-
ees in the larger unit" that placement in that unit prohibited adequate
representation .2 9
2
281. Id. at 1030.
282. Id. In rejecting the "disparity of interests" standard, the Board stated that "had Congress
intended to work such a radical departure in Board unit determinations, we hardly think it likely
that it would have relegated its instructions to a few ambiguous statements in the legislative his-
tory." Id. at 1030-31.
283. Id. at 1029.
284. Id. at 1029, 1031-32. The Board neglected to mention guards in its formulation of the two
tiered test, presumably because guards are entitled to a separate unit under the Act. See 29
U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988).
285. St. Francis Hosp. ("St. Francis I"), 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1032 (1982).
286. Id. at 1029, 1031-32.
287. Id. at 1032-33.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1034.
290. Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting); id. at 1042 (Hunter, Member, dissenting).
291. Id. at 1040 (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting); id. at 1046-47 (Hunter, Member,
dissenting).
292. Id. at 1040 (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting); id. at 1047 (Hunter, Member, dissent-
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Shortly after St. Francis I was decided, the courts of appeals began render-
ing decisions more favorable to the Board. The Second, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits enforced Board bargaining orders and sharply criticized the "dispar-
ity of interests" test adopted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.29 3 The Second
Circuit enforced a Board bargaining order with a unit of service and mainte-
nance employees.294 Rejecting the "rigid 'disparity of interests' test" because
that test would unduly hamper employees in their abilities to organize, 99 the
court found no legislative mandate "requir[ing] the Board to begin its consid-
eration of the appropriateness of a unit with a presumption in favor of wall-to-
wall units."296 Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit specifically declined to adopt the
"disparity of interests" test when it enforced a Board bargaining order with a
unit of technical employees.219 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the test and
enforced a Board bargaining order with a unit of registered nurses. 99 During
this period of change by the courts, the composition of the Board also began to
change. New members influenced Board determinations of appropriate health
care bargaining units. 99
ing). Member Hunter qualified his "reluctan[ce] to apply any presumptions," yet he.adopted the
"disparity of interests" test. Id. at 1047 n.126 (Hunter, Member, dissenting). St. Francis I elicited
commentary, but little of it was favorable. See Curley, supra note 210, at 121-22 (stating that the
Board's approach does not heed "admonition," as so-called screening process is "transparent and
unacceptable"); Comment, The Nonproliferation Mandate and the Appropriate Legal Standard
In Health Care Bargaining Unit Determinations, I 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 663, 690-92 (finding that
the two-tiered test constitutes undue proliferation and urging the NLRB to adopt a "disparity of
interests" test). 'But see Stapp, Ten Years After: A Legal Framework of Collective Bargaining in
the Hospital Industry, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63, 71-76 (1984) (stating that the Board's approach
more adequately protects employee rights, but the proper approach is to balance employee rights
with preventing disruptions to patient care).
293. See NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1539 n.4 (1 th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 726 F.2d 755 (1984); Watonwan Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850
(8th Cir. 1983); Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Food v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 641-42 (2d
Cir. 1983).
294. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Food v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1983).
295. Id. at 640-42. The Second Circuit was sharply critical of the "disparity of interests" test
and characterized it as "taken from the language, if not the thought of Senator Williams." Id.
296. Id.
297. Watonwan Memorial Hosp., 711 F.2d at 848.
298. NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1539 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1984).
The Seventh Circuit also enforced a Board bargaining order involving LPNs in a nursing home
but did not adopt or reject the "disparity of interests" test. NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d
1461, 1472 (7th Cir. 1983).
299. St. Francis I was decided by a full Board, Chairman Van de Water and Members Fan-
ning, Hunter, Jenkins, and Zimmerman. The majority consisted of Members Fanning, Jenkins,
and Zimmerman, all appointed by President Carter. See Gregory, supra note 28, at 41. The dis-
senters, Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter were then recent appointees of President
Reagan. The change of a single vote could result in a reversal of St. Francis L For a discussion of
the impact of changes in Board membership on Board law, see supra notes 193-96 and accompa-
nying text.
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2. St. Francis II
The NLRB abandoned the standard developed in St. Francis I less than two
years after it was adopted and before it was reviewed by the court of appeals.
In St. Francis Hospital ("St. Francis 11"),00 the NLRB vacated its earlier
decision and adopted the "disparity of interests" standard. 3 1 The Board rea-
soned that this standard better implemented its statutory obligations and the
"congressional admonition" to prevent proliferation.102 In adopting the "dis-
parity of interests" standard, the Board rejected the two-tiered test because it
was "contrary to the intent of Congress."803 This new standard required
"sharper than usual differences (or 'disparities') between the wages, hours,
and working conditions, etc., of the requested employees and those in an over-
all professional or nonprofessional unit."" 4 According to this Board, the "dis-
parity of interest" standard did not translate into a per se rule of only two
appropriate units of professionals and nonprofessionals. 0 5 Instead, the Board
suggested that the standard judged each petition individually.306
Board Member Dennis, concurring, supported the "disparity of interests"
test.30 7 Dennis suggested that the test might yield four units in large diversi-
fied health care institutions: professionals, technical employees, office clerical
employees, and service and maintenance employees.308 Dennis claimed, how-
ever, the test only created two units in smaller facilities: professionals and
nonprofessionals.309
In his dissent, Board Member Zimmerman criticized the Board for failing
to state explicitly what factors, if any, might account for "sharper disparities
of interests."3 10 Responding to the majority's assertion that they were not cre-
ating a two-unit standard, Zimmerman criticized the Board for not revealing
what employers, unions, and employees "need most to know: what number and
kind of bargaining units will generally be found appropriate." '' He found lit-
tle basis in the legislative history to support a "disparity of interests" standard,
300. 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984). When the Board decided St. Francis 11 the membership had
changed to include a new Chairman, Dotson, and Members Hunter, Dennis, and Zimmerman.
See Gregory, supra note 28, at 41 n. 11 (describing the problems created by the fact that the
Board was understaffed during "most of President Reagan's first term"). Dotson, Hunter, and
Dennis were all Reagan appointees and they combined to form the new majority in St. Francis H.
Id. at 41.
301. St. Francis 11, 271 N.L.R.B. at 950.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 953.
305. Id. "We caution, however, that no unit is per se appropriate and that separate representa-
tion must be justified upon each factual record in light of the disparity of interests test as we have
refined it." Id. at 954.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 954-55.
308. Id. at 955 (Dennis, Member, concurring).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 956 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
311. Id.
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and claimed the standard was a "gross and unnecessary overreaction" to judi-
cial criticism.3 12 Asserting that the lack of certainty regarding appropriate
units had "paralyzed" the Board's representation decisions, the dissent urged
the Board to end the debate over the proper legal standard for bargaining
units. ' Instead of constantly debating the issue, Zimmerman suggested that
the Board should either seek Supreme Court review or invoke its rulemaking
powers to establish appropriate bargaining units.314 Zimmerman gained sup-
port for his rulemaking suggestion from Member Dennis, who agreed that the
"disparity of interests" standard did not provide the industry with sufficient
guidelines, despite her general support for this standard. 15
The range of choices available to health care employees seeking to organize
smaller units diminished soon after St. Francis II. The NLRB reversed earlier
decisions of the regional directors that found units of registered nurses appro-
priate. In these cases, the Board indicated that the only appropriate unit con-
sisted solely of professionals.316 The "disparity of interests" test also affected
the organization of nonprofessional employees. This impact was caused by the
Board's refusal to find a unit of skilled maintenance employees appropriate. In
addition to the rejection of this unit, the Board required business clerical em-
ployees to be placed in a unit with service, maintenance, and technical
employees.35 7
Nonetheless, the "disparity of interests" test was soon challenged in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 18 In
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB,3 the
312. Id. at 958.
313. Id. at 955.
314. Id. at 955, 958.
315. Id. at 954-55 (Dennis, Member, concurring). St. Francis I1 attracted commentary. See
Annual Survey of Labor Law. A Second Decade of Health Care Bargaining Unit Litigation: St.
Francis 11, 27 B.C.L. REv. 53, 58 (1985) (stating that the NLRB overreacted to criticism from the
courts of appeals and should have adopted a balancing approach). But see Dyleski-Miller, Profes-
sional Unions in the Health Care Industry: The Impact of St. Francis I1 and North Shore Hosp.,
17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 383, 420-21 (1986) (approving "disparity of interests" test and urging the
Board to apply it strictly to prevent proliferation).
316. See Middletown Hosp. Ass'n, 282 N.L.R.B. 541, 541 (1986) (holding that a unit of regis-
tered nurses is not appropriate under the "disparity of interests" test; an appropriate unit is one
consisting of all professionals); North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 279 N.L.R.B. 311, 312 (1986); Keo-
kuk Area Hosp., 278 N.L.R.B. 242, 242 (1986).
317. See, e.g., Baker Hosp., 279 N.L.R.B. 308, 310 (1986) (holding that business office clerical
employees do not possess sufficient disparity of interests to be excluded from the service, mainte-
nance and technical employee unit); Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 278 N.L.R.B. 80, 80 (1986)
(holding that a separate unit of skilled maintenance employees is not appropriate under the "dis-
parity of interests" test); St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1431 (1985) (holding
that a separate unit of LPNs is not appropriate under the "disparity of interests" test); cf South-
ern Md. Hosp. Center, 274 N.L.R.B. 1470, 1470 (1985) (holding that technical employees possess
sufficient disparity of interests to warrant a separate unit).
318. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
319. Id.
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D.C. Circuit reversed St. Francis II and remanded the case to the Board.320
The court claimed St. Francis II was motivated by an erroneous belief that
the legislative history containing the "congressional admonition" mandated a
"disparity of interests" test.321 To the contrary, the court suggested that as a
result of Congress' failure to modify section 9(b) of the Act, the Legislature
"implicitly approved the Board's forty-year construction of section 9 to em-
body community-of-interest criteria.""' The court also minimized the weight
of the "congressional admonition," noting that committee reports "cannot
serve as an independent statutory source having the force of law.'' 3 13 Judge
Buckley, concurring, attached no significance to the committee reports and
declared the admonition "a legal nullity."' 2 In remanding the case to the
Board, the D.C. Circuit expressed no opinion on whether the Board was au-
thorized to adopt a "disparity of interests" test at its discretion. 25 The court,
however, decided that the Board could not adopt the test based on the legisla-
tive history alone. 2
3. St. Francis III
On remand, the NLRB again adopted the "disparity of interests" test in St.
Francis Hospital ("St. Francis III")."' While acknowledging the D.C. Cir-
cuit's criticisms, the NLRB asserted that it did not imply that the "disparity
of interests" test was mandated by the legislative history of the Health Care
Amendments. 28 In response to the D.C. Circuit's criticisms, the Board, refer-
ring to section 9(b) of the NLRA, carefully pointed out that adopting the
"disparity of interests" test was within its discretion. 29 The Board asserted
320. Id. at 715.
321. Id. at 708, 715. The Board objected to this characterizafion of St. Francis II. "The Board
did not say, or intend to say, that anything in the 1974 amendments or their legislative history
mandates the adoption of a 'disparity of interests' standard." St. Vincent Hosp., 285 N.L.R.B.
365, 367 (1987) (emphasis in original); accord The D.C. Circuit Review: The D.C. Circuit Strug-
gles with Standards of Reviewability, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 960, 965 (1988) (stating that the
court misinterpreted the NLRB's "construction of ... congressional admonition as mandating...
disparity of interests standard").
322. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 711.
323. Id. at712 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
324. Id. at 718 (Buckley, J., concurring).
325. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 n.65 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
326. Id. at 715. Three months later, the Third Circuit joined the D.C., Second, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits by declining to adopt the "disparity of interests" test. St. John's Gen. Hosp. v.
NLRB, 825 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit noted that all of the
circuits except the D.C. Circuit had concluded that the Board must consider the "congressional
admonition" in making its unit determinations. Id. at 743. The court concluded that the NLRB
had given sufficient weight to the "admonition" and enforced the Board's bargaining order. Id. at
746.
327. 286 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1305-06 (1987). The Board actually adopted the "disparity of inter-
ests" test just a few months earlier in St. Vincent Hosp., 285 N.L.R.B. 365 (1987).
328. St. Francis III, 286 N.L.R.B. at 1305-06.
329. Id. at 1306.
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that its use of the test was not based solely on the legislative history of the
Health Care Amendments, nor did this legislative history mandate the use of
this test.330 Attracting the attention of organized labor and the health care
industry employers, St. Francis III demonstrated the NLRB's intention to use
rulemaking as a method of determining appropriate collective bargaining units
for the health care industry.3 3
1
II, THE NLRB ADOPTS RULEMAKING
The NLRB derives its powers from the NLRA 32 This statute empowers
the Board to adjudicate labor disputes arising under the Act, and promulgate
rules and regulations 3 3 subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").3 3 4 Although section 6 of the NLRA3 3 5 explicitly authorizes the
Board to issue and use substantive rules, the "choice . . .between proceeding
by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
the informed discretion of the administrative agency." 330
Section 553 of the APA 3  establishes the procedures for administrative
agencies to use in order to engage in "notice-and-comment" rulemaking. 3 8 In
notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency announces its intent to promul-
gate a new rule and invites public comment before it issues the final rule.339
Such rules, sometimes known as "legislative rules," are rules issued by an
agency pursuant to an express or implied grant of authority. These rules have
330. Id.
331. See id. at 1306 n.26. The Board initially announced its decision to embark on rulemaking
by publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and referred to that deci-
sion in a case decided only two months before St. Francis III. See St. Vincent Hosp., 285
N.L.R.B. 365, 365 (1987) (citing Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52
Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103)). The Board's decision to engage in
rulemaking has been approved by several commentators. See, e.g., Koziara & Schwartz, Unit
Determination Standards-The NLRB Tries Rulemaking, 14 EMP. REL. L.J. 75, 91 (1988) (ap-
proving the Board's decision to try rulemaking and urging an end to the debate over proper bar-
gaining units in the health care industry); Sharo, Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health
Care Industry, 5 LAB. LAw. 787, 815 (approving the Board's use of rulemaking and the units
established by the Rule).
332. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166 (1988).
333. Id. § 156.
334. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701, 706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1988).
335. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988). This section provides in relevant part that, "the Board shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of the Act." Id.
336. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974).
337. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
338. Id.
339. The APA states that " 'rule' means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988). The APA defines "rule making" as the "agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." Id. § 551(5).
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the binding force of law3 40 and may only be applied prospectively.
4 1
The debate between rulemaking and adjudication 342 in formulating agency
policy has elicited proponents in favor of each approach. Proponents of
rulemaking stress the following advantages of this method of development of
agency policy: the process allows "participation by all affected parties", rules
"apply prospectively" rather than retrospectively, rules provide "uniformity",
and rules present an opportunity for parties to engage in "politicking" to shape
the regulations that will affect them. 43 Advocates of adjudication, however,
stress that the adjudication process is more flexible than rulemaking, allows
the agency to make case-specific decisions, and allows agencies to respond
quickly to "new and unexpected" situations."'
Despite its explicit authority to promulgate rules, the NLRB rarely invoked
its rulemaking powers, choosing instead to develop substantive rules through
case-by-case adjudications.34 5 The Board resisted rulemaking primarily be-
cause it has viewed the rulemaking process as cumbersome. 8" In contrast,
case-by-case adjudication allowed speed and flexibility in responding to con-
stantly changing industrial practices.34 7 In recent years, several commentators
have urged the Board to make use of its rulemaking powers. One chief advan-
tage of rulemaking is the opportunity for parties to obtain information and
participate in the development of legal rules and regulations affecting them.348
340. A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, STATE & FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 249 (1989) [here-
inafter BONFIELD & AsIMow].
341. See Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd., 488 U.S.
204 (1988).
342. The APA states that "'adjudication' means agency process for the formulation of an or-
der." 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1988). "'[O]rder' means the whole or a part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other
than rule making but including licensing." Id. § 551(6). Section 554 of the APA describes the
procedures and provisions of adjudications. Id. § 554.
343. See BONFIELD & AsIMow, supra note 340, at 258-60 (comparing advantages and disad-
vantages of rulemaking and adjudication).
344. Id. at 259-60; see also Gregory, supra note 28, at 42-46 (urging that the NLRB resist
efforts to use rulemaking and continue to use adjudication to develop labor law and policy).
345. See Estreicher, supra note 28, at 179 (stating that the Board has accumulated fifty years
of experience making decisional law); Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Case
for Making Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. L.J. 105, 111-12 (1981) (stating that
the Board has resisted rulemaking in favor of adjudication). The NLRB has, however, established
statements of procedure and procedural rules and regulations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101, 102 (1989).
The Board has also exercised its rulemaking power to establish jurisdictional standards for col-
leges and universities and the horse racing and dog racing industries. 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.1, 103.3
(1989).
346. Subrin, supra note 345, at 111.
347. Id. at 111-12.
348. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 28, at 170 n.29 (stating that rulemaking is particularly
well suited for dealing with reversals in agency action and citing commentators who enthusiasti-
cally endorse rulemaking); Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House: Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?. 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 27, 41 (1987) (rulemaking "is probably the most important
thing the Board can do to . . . advise . . . people who need to know . . . what the law requires"
of them). Judges have also suggested that the NLRB might be entitled to more deference if it
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Those commentators particularly encouraged the Board to use its rulemaking
powers to determine appropriate collective bargaining units. 3 9
On July 2, 1987, the NLRB broke with its long-standing history of develop-
ing substantive rules solely through adjudication. The Board published a no-
tice of proposed rulemaking for determining collective bargaining units in the
health care industry.350 The Board supported its decision to engage in
rulemaking with both the section 6 grant of rulemaking power, and its discre-
tion in choosing to proceed through either adjudication or rulemaking.3 51 After
reviewing its years of experience in the health care industry, the Board stated
that none of the tests it implemented in making unit decisions enjoyed wide-
spread judicial acceptance." 2 The Board recognized that employers, unions,
and employees needed clearer guidance,3"3 and therefore, it proposed rulemak-
ing as a more effective vehicle to make unit decisions. 36 The Board asserted
that rulemaking proceedings often provided empirical evidence about the inci-
dence of strikes, sympathy strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and wage competi-
tion among health care employees.355 These employee tactics motivated the
"congressional admonition" against unit proliferation. 356 The evidence also re-
sulted in more informed Board judgments. 357 The Board stressed that case-by-
case adjudication proved to be costly, laborious, and repetitive, while employ-
ees continued to fall into fairly predictable groupings.3"8
The NLRB proposed six collective bargaining units for large acute care hos-
pitals: (1) registered nurses; (2) physicians; (3) all professionals excluding reg-
istered nurses; (4) technical employees; (5) service, maintenance, and clerical
employees; and (6) guards. 69 It proposed only four units for small acute care
employed rulemaking. See Continental Web Press Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1093-94 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Friendly, J.).
349. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 145 (1972); Koziara & Schwartz, supra note 331,
at 83-84; Morris, supra note 348, at 41; Subrin, supra note 345, at 107-09. Two commentators
have noted that in 1978 Congress considered requiring the Board to invoke its rulemaking power
for bargaining units. Koziara & Schwartz, supra note 331, at 83-84 (citing S. REP. No. 628, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1978)).
350. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142-49 (1987)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed July 2, 1987).
351. NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9342, 19,178, 19,182-83 (July 24, 1987) (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)). The NLRB acknowl-
edged this was a new endeavor for the Board, but that several state labor agencies had engaged in
rulemaking to determine appropriate collective bargaining units in public employment. Id. at
19,185 n.39 (referring to rulemaking by Florida and Massachusetts labor agencies).
352. Id. at 19,179-81.
353. Id. at 19,179.
354. Id. at 19,181-82.
355. Id. at 19,181.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 19,182.
359. Id. at 19,187-89.
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hospitals and nursing homes: (1) all professional employees, (2) all technical
employees, (3) all service, maintenance, and clerical employees, and (4) all
guards.360 Although stressing that it had a "completely open mind," the
NLRB proposed these units based on its adjudication experience.36 The
Board, however, invited response and comment to these proposals. 362
Overwhelmed with responses from both organized labor and the health care
industry, the NLRB extended the notice and comment period three times. The
hospital industry overwhelmingly opposed the rules while organized labor
strongly favored their adoption." The NLRB issued a second notice of pro-
posed rulemaking on September 1, 1988.34 The Board abandoned the distinc-
tion between large and small acute care hospitals and removed nursing homes
and psychiatric care hospitals from the scope of the rule.36 5 The NLRB pro-
posed a total of eight appropriate units, adding separate units for both busi-
ness clerical employees and skilled maintenance employees.66 The Board
stated these would be the only appropriate units. Although the Board created
an "extraordinary circumstances" exception, it stressed that it construed the
exception narrowly, so as to avoid creating a "loophole" for unnecessary litiga-
tion.36 7 The NLRB examined the evidence in the rulemaking record regarding
the incidence of strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and wage competition, such as
whipsawing and leap-frogging, in order to discern whether they had arisen in
the proposed units.3 68 The Board found that the incidence of strikes in the
industry was low, and jurisdictional disputes and wage competition rarely oc-
curred.3 66 This low incidence of strikes, disputes, and competition was appar-
ently the result of separate labor markets for physicians, registered nurses,
technical employees, clerical employees, and skilled maintenance employees.
The Board concluded that these units were appropriate and did not encourage
the adverse effects that Congress had associated with proliferation.3 70
360. Id. at 19,189.
361. Id. at 19,186.
362. Id.
363. In a rare instance of agreement both the hospital industry and labor organizations opposed
the one hundred bed distinction. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed.
Reg. 33,900, 33,927 (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed Sept. 1, 1988).
364. Id. at 33,900-35 (1988) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30) (proposed Sept. 1, 1988).
365. Id. at 33,934. The hospital industry and the unions both opposed the one hundred bed
distinction, claiming that bed size had little bearing on the appropriate unit issue in various hospi-
tals. Nursing homes and psychiatric hospitals were dropped from the scope of the rule. Id. at
33,927.
366. Id. at 33,934. The eighth unit consisted of all nonprofessional employees excluding techni-
cal employees, skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. Id.
367. Id. at 33,932. The Board designated eight appropriate collective bargaining units: (1) reg-
istered nurses, (2) physicians, (3) all professional employees excluding physicians and registered
nurses, (4) technical employees, (5) skilled maintenance employees, (6) business office clerical
employees, (7) guards, and (8) all nonprofessional employees except for technical employees,
skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. Id. at 33,934.
368. Id. at 33,911-27.
369. Id. at 33,908-09.
370. Id. at 39,333-34. The Board examined the record and concluded that the incidence of
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Seven months later, the NLRB issued its Final Rule ("the Rule"). s75 The
strikes in the industry was low, that there was little correlation with the number of bargaining
units in health care facilities and the incidence of strikes, that strikes tended to occur more fre-
quently in larger units than in smaller units, and that "strikes in broader units have the greatest
impact on health care." Id. at 33,909.
Member Johansen dissented from the decision to engage in rulemaking, preferring to submit the
unit proliferation issues to the Supreme Court for resolution. Id. at 33,934-35.
371. The Code of Federal Regulations sets forth appropriate bargaining units in the health care
industry:
(a) This portion of the rule shall be applicable to acute care hospitals, as defined in
paragraph (f) of this section: Except in extraordinary circumstances and in circum-
stances in which there are existing non-conforming units, the following shall be appro-
priate units, and the only appropriate units, for petitions filed pursuant to section
9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(I)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, except
that, if sought by labor organizations, various combinations of units may also be
appropriate:
(1) All registered nurses.
(2) All physicians.
(3) All professionals except for registered nurses and physicians.
(4) All technical employees.
(5) All skilled maintenance employees.
(6) All business office clerical employees.
(7) All guards.
(8) All nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled mainte-
nance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. Provided That a unit
of five or fewer employees shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
(b) Where extraordinary circumstances exist, the Board shall determine appropriate
units by adjudication.
(c) Where there are existing nonconforming units in acute care hospitals, and a peti-
tion for additional units is filed pursuant to sec. 9(c)(l)(A)(i) or 9(c)(l)(B), the
Board shall find appropriate only units which comport, insofar as practicable, with the
appropriate unit set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) The Board will approve consent agreements providing for elections in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section, but nothing shall preclude regional directors from
approving stipulations not in accordance with paragraph (a), as long as the stipula-
tions are otherwise acceptable.
(e) This rule will apply to all cases decided on or after May 22, 1989.
(f) For purposes of this rule, the term:
(1) "Hospital" is defined in the same manner as defined in the Medicare Act,
which definition is incorporated herein (currently set forth in 42 U.S.C. 1395x(e), as
revised 1988);
(2) "Acute care hospital" is defined as: either a short term care hospital in which
the average length of patient stay is less than thirty days, or a short term care hospi-
tal in which over 50% of all patients are admitted to units where the average length
of patient stay is less than thirty days. Average length of stay shall be determined by
reference to the most recent twelve month period preceding receipt of a representation
petition for which data is readily available. The term "acute care hospital" shall in-
clude those hospitals operating as acute care facilities even if those hospitals provide
such services as, for example, long term care, outpatient care, psychiatric care, or
rehabilitative care, but shall exclude facilities that are primarily nursing homes, pri-
marily psychiatric hospitals, or primarily rehabilitation hospitals. Where, after issu-
ance of a subpoena, an employer does not produce r~cords sufficient for the Board to
determine the facts, the Board may presume the employer is an acute care hospital.
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Board stated that the language of the Act did not preclude the Board from
promulgating rules to determine collective bargaining units.372 The Board
maintained that its Rule was entirely consistent with section 9(b) of the Act,
despite that section's requirement that the Board determine an appropriate
unit in each case.3 73 When parties cannot agree on an appropriate unit, the
Board directs a hearing and "ultimately render[s] a decision of the appropri-
ate unit applicable to that particular petition and that particular employer's
operation."3 4 Although the Rule established clear guidelines for employers,
unions, and employees as to what kinds of units are appropriate, the Board
rejected the suggestion to adopt rebuttable presumptions instead. 75
The final Rule designated eight units as "the only appropriate units," for
acute care hospitals: 78 (1) physicians, (2) registered nurses, (3) all other pro-
fessionals excluding physicians and registered nurses, (4) technical employees,
(5) skilled maintenance employees, (6) business clerical employees, (7) guards,
and (8) all nonprofessional employees excluding technical employees, skilled
maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. 3' 7 In
addition to these units, the Rule provides that various combinations of the
proposed units may be appropriate if petitioned for by labor organizations.37 8
The Board announced that any unit consisting of five or fewer employees auto-
matically triggers the "extraordinary circumstances" exception, which requires
the Board to decide the appropriate unit through adjudication. 379 Finally, the
Board excluded nursing homes, psychiatric hospitals, and rehabilitation hospi-
(3) "Psychiatric hospital" is defined in the same manner as defined in the Medicare
Act, which definition is incorporated herein (currently set forth in 42 U.S.C.
1395x(f)).
(4) The term "rehabilitation hospital" includes and is limited to all hospitals ac-
credited as such by either Joint Committee on Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions or by Commission for Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities.
(5) A "non-conforming unit" is defined as a unit other than those described in
paragraphs (a)(l) through (8) of this section or a combination among those eight
units.
(6) Appropriate units in all other health care facilities: The Board will determine
appropriate units in other healthcare facilities, as defined in section 2(14) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, by adjudication.
29 C.F.R. 103.30 (1989).
372. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,338 (1989)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
373. Id.
374. Id. The Board insisted that it could rely upon the Rule, developed through APA rulemak-
ing, just as it had relied upon rules developed in common law fashion through adjudications. Id.
375. Id.
376. For the statutory definitions of "hospital" and "acute care hospital," see supra note 371.
377. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1989).
378. Id.
379. Id. § 103.30(a), (b). The Board also announced that where there are existing nonconform-
ing units it would make decisions on petitions for units embraced in the Rule insofar as it was
practicable. Id. § 103.30(a), (c).
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tals from the scope of the Rule.380
On April 21, 1989, the NLRB completed its first effort at substantive
rulemaking.38 ' The remaining issue facing the Board was whether the hospital
industry would accept the Rule or mount a legal challenge.
III. THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION V. NLRB DECISION
The NLRB waited only hours for an answer. On April 21, 1989, the Ameri-
can Hospital Association ("AHA") filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking preliminary and per-
manent injunctions against enforcement of the Rule." 2 The AHA proposed
three arguments in favor of enjoining the Rule. First, the AHA argued that
the Rule violated section 9(b) of the NLRA which states that bargaining unit
decisions must be made "in each case. '38 3 Second, the AHA argued that the
Rule violated a statutory mandate that the NLRB prevent proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry. 84 Third, the AHA argued that
the Rule was "arbitrary and capricious."3 5 On May 22, 1989 the court issued
a preliminary injunction against the Rule. 88 On July 25, 1989 the court ad-
dressed the merits and entered a permanent injunction. 38 7
The district court began its analysis of the arguments with the language of
the Act. The court decided the language of section 9(b), which authorizes the
Board to make unit determinations "in each case, ' 3 18 and section 6, which
gives the Board rulemaking powers,388 did not give a "definite answer" to the
380. Id. § 103.30(f)(2).
381. Id. § 103.30(e). The Board announced that the Rule would be applied prospectively to any
cases decided on or after May 22, 1989. Id.
382. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1989), appeals docketed,
Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989); see also
Memorandum of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and
the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. I11. 1989) (No.
89 C 3279) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Memorandum]; Memorandum for the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, American Hosp. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (No. 89 C 3279) [hereinafter NLRB Memorandum];
American Hospital Associations Memorandum of Law in Support of the Permanent Injunctive
Relief and Declaratory Relief, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Il1.
1989) (No. 89 C 3279) [hereinafter AHA Memorandum].
383. American Hosp. Ass'n, 718 F. Supp. at 705.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. The NLRB moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
urging that the court of appeals was the proper forum. The court denied the Board's motion
because the complaint did not challenge a representational issue under the Rule, but the Board's
authority to make the Rule. Id. (citing American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 515,
(N.D. I1l.), affd, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975)).
387. Id. at 716.
388. Id. at 711.
389. Id.
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Board's authority to issue the Rule."' 0 Accordingly, the court turned to the
legislative history of the NLRA to determine Congress' purposes in enacting
section 9(b).
The court examined the legislative history and found strong indicia of con-
gressional intent that the NLRB would make individualized unit determina-
tions.39' The court rejected the Board's assertion that the "in each case" lan-
guage was just an amendment added for the "sake of clarity,"'392 and declined
to accept a construction of the statute which would render the language "su-
perfluous."393 Furthermore, the court suggested that the phrase should not be
read in isolation from the rest of the Act.394 The court found it more "plausi-
ble" that case-by-case determinations would better implement the directive of
section 9(b) to assure employees their "fullest freedom" in exercising their
rights to organize and bargain collectively under the Act.' 9"
Despite these findings, the court did not find the Rule invalid under section
9(b). Indeed, the court observed that individualized unit determinations were
not "necessarily inconsistent" with the Board's rulemaking powers under sec-
tion 6.391 The court decided to leave the issue of whether section 9(b) limited
the scope of the Board's rulemaking powers generally, and turned to the
AHA's second argument, that the Rule violated the "congressional admoni-
tion" against unit proliferation in the health care industry. 397
The court reviewed the legislative history surrounding unit proliferation and
observed that several courts of appeals had questioned how much weight the
390. Id.
391. Id. at 712. The following passage was particularly relevant: "Section 9(b) provides that
the Board shall determine ... the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining....
This matter is obviously one for determination in each individual case, and the only possible
workable arrangement is to authorize the impartial governmental agency, the Board, to make that
determination." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT Pt. 1, at 2930 (1935)) (empha-
sis added by the court).
392. Id. at 712. The original texts of the House and Senate bills did not contain the "in each
case" language presently found in § 9(b). Id. at 711. The final version of the Act contained the
"in each case" language. The Board tried to place that language in context. The Board relied on
the remark by Secretary of Labor Perkins that the amendment was for the "sake of clarity" by
suggesting that in context, the language was added only to emphasize that the task of making unit
decisions belongs to the Board, not employers or unions. Id. at 712. The court rejected the Board's
argument and discounted the value of Perkins' statement because "no significance is to be ac-
corded statements made by nonmembers in a Congressional hearing." Id. (citing Kelly v. Robin-
son, 479 U.S. 36, 51 n.13 (1986)).
393. Id. The court declined to accept the Board's suggestion that the "in each case" language
was simply added to emphasize that the Board must make unit decisions. To accept the Board's
reading of the statute would render the meaning of the words superfluous. Id. (citing Zimmerman
v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983)).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 713.
397. Id.
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legislative history should be given."' 8 The court acknowledged that the Seventh
Circuit had not defined how much proliferation was "undue," but that it had
treated the "admonition" as authoritative. 99
The district court held that the Rule violated the "congressional admoni-
tion" against proliferation. 00 The court stated that the Rule mandated "auto-
matic fragmentation" of the health care industry into eight units, without con-
sidering the impact of such a rule on particular institutions.40 ' Moreover, the
court suggested that the Rule could, perhaps, coerce workers to organize into
the units permitted by the Rule. 0 2 The court reasoned that in order to comply
with the "congressional admonition," the Board "must use the means least
likely to cause unit proliferation,"' 03 and that this Rule did not prevent "un-
due proliferation. 1 40 4
The court rejected an argument offered by the American Federation of La-
bor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), participating as
amicus curiae.""8 The AFL-CIO stressed that the "admonition" should be an-
alyzed as only one of the factors the Board is required to use in making unit
determinations. 40 The court conceded that the AFL-CIO argument was
"compelling," but rejected the invitation to balance the proliferation concerns
with section 9(b)'s directive to assure employees their "fullest freedom" to
exercise their rights under the Act.' 7 The court concluded that the AHA had
prevailed on the merits, and that the unique concerns of the health care indus-
try warranted a permanent injunction. 40 8
398. Id.
399.. Id. at 713-14.
400. Id. at 714.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 715.
403. Id. at 714.
404. Id. at 716.
405. AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382.
406. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 714 (N.D. Il1. 1989), appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir Aug. 3, 1989). The
AFL-CIO attempted to define proliferation and place it in historical context. The AFL-CIO con-
tended that, while much of the health care industry was unorganized in 1974, a significant num-
ber of bargaining units had formed under state laws. This intervening lobbying group claimed that
the NLRB had issued pre-amendment decisions certifying separate units of professionals and
paraprofessionals. It asserted that the AHA and its state affiliates had introduced the term
"proliferation" during the hearings and that the "congressional admonition" must be understood
against this backdrop. AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at 13-16.
The AFL-CIO suggested the "congressional admonition" was "not a command to the Board to
avoid 'proliferation' at all costs; rather, the 'admonition' instructs the Board to give 'due consider-
ation' to avoiding proliferation." Id. at 17 (emphasis in original). Instead, § 9(b) is a command to
the Board to "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
Act." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988)).
407. American Hosp. Ass'n, 718 F. Supp. at 704, 714.
408. Id. at 716. The court did not reach the AHA's third argument that the Rule was arbitrary
and capricious. The court decided to enjoin the Rule because it violated the "congressional admo-
nition." Id. at 716 n.17. The AHA asserted that the rule was arbitrary and capricious and not
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 705; see also AHA Memorandum, supra note 382, at 28.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The American Hospital Association decision prevents the Board from using
its most recent and innovative method of determining appropriate collective
bargaining units within the health care industry. The court should have upheld
the Rule and denied the AHA's request for a permanent injunction for the
following two reasons: (1) the Board's authority to use rulemaking is consis-
tent with the "in each case" language of section 9(b)409 of the Act; and (2) the
Rule strikes a proper balance between the statutory requirement to assure em-
ployees their "fullest freedom" to organize for collective bargaining purposes
and Congress's intent that the Board should strive to prevent bargaining unit
proliferation. 410
A. The Scope of the Board's Rulemaking Powers
The American Hospital Association court did not decide the issue of
whether the "in each case" language of section 9(b) precludes the Board from
using its rulemaking authority to determine appropriate collective bargaining
units.411 The court decided the case on the basis of the "congressional admoni-
tion."41 The Seventh Circuit, however, will need to decide whether the Board
acted within its statutory authority in order to ascertain the validity of the
Rule.
The Board did not exceed its statutory authority by establishing the Rule.""3
The AHA's arguments criticized the Board for an attempt to "second guess Congress," that the
record evidence did not support the Board's eight-unit rule. Id. at 30, 33. Because the court did
not reach this argument, this Note cannot assess its position on the issue.
The court also granted petitioners, AFL-CIO and the American Nurses Association ("ANA")
status as permissive intervenors, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). American Hosp. Ass'n, 718 F.
Supp. at 716 n.18. The Seventh Circuit denied the Board's request for an expedited appeal. See 3
Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) at 793 (Aug. 23, 1989). The AFL-CIO and ANA also filed appeals and
the Seventh Circuit consolidated all appeals. American Hosp. Ass'n, 718 F. Supp. at 716. The
Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on January 10, 1990. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at
A-9 (Jan. 11, 1990).
409. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988).
410. Id.; Stapp, supra note 292, at 71 n.65, 72-73; AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at
17; see also NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab.
L. Rep. (CCH) 9342, 19,178 (July 2, 1987). The Board, in its proposal for a bargaining unit
rule, stated that:
the Board must effectuate section 7 rights by permitting bargaining in cohesive units,
units with interests both shared within the group and disparate from those possessed
by others; weighed against this must be Congress' expressed desire to avoid prolifera-
tion in order to avoid disruption in patient care, unwarranted unit fragmentation lead-
ing to jurisdictional disputes and work stoppages, and increased costs due to whipsaw
strikes and wage leapfrogging.
Id. at 19,181.
411. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 713 (N.D. I1. 1989).
412. Id. at 713, 716.
413. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988); see also Sharo, supra note 331, at 819 (stating that § 6 gives
the Board authority to make the Rule).
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The Board's authority to make rules is firmly established by Congress's exten-
sive grant of power in section 6. Section 6 authorizes the Board to make rules
and regulations in order to carry out the provisions of the Act.414 Section 6
imposes no restrictions on the Board's rulemaking power generally, let alone
with respect to determining bargaining units.415 As the Supreme Court has
established, the Board may, in its discretion, choose to proceed through either
rulemaking or adjudication.41 " Furthermore, the Board may determine collec-
tive bargaining units rules established in conformance with the APA without
running afoul of section 9(b)'s requirement that the Board make unit determi-
nations "in each case. 4 17
The district court noted that section 9(b) need not preclude the Board from
using rulemaking. 418 The court pointed out that' it defies common sense to be-
lieve that Congress would charge the Board to make unit determinations be-
cause of its experience and expertise, and then, simultaneously, require it to
face each contested case ab initio."9 All that section 9(b) requires is that the
Board must make unit determinations "in each case. 4 20 Section 9(b) neither
prescribes nor prohibits the source of law for the Board to use in making those
decisions.42' Accordingly, the Board retains its discretion to make unit deci-
sions. The Board may apply rules it has developed through adjudication or
through rules established in accordance with the rulemaking procedures re-
quired by the APA. 4 22
What the district court failed to emphasize is that the Rule, by itself, does
not impose a single unit on any hospital. Hospital employees must first choose
to organize.423 If hospital employees choose to organize, the Rule eliminates
the confusion and uncertainty of the previously used tests by identifying eight
appropriate units.424 If the hospital and the union agree to an election in one
of the units established by the Rule, that is the end of the matter.4 26 Yet in
414. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988). The rules and regulations must, of course, be developed according
to the procedures established by the APA. See id.
415. Id.; see K. DAVIs, supra note 349, at 145; Sharo, supra note 331, at 819; Collective-
Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,901 (1988) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 103.30).
416. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
417. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,338
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30); Sharo, supra note 331, at 819.
418. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 713 (N.D. I11. 1989).
419. Id. (emphasis in original).
420. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988).
421. Id.; see NLRB Memorandum, supra note 382, at 7.
422. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 382, at 7.
423. The NLRB does not act on its own motion in deciding representational issues. Issues must
first arise through filing petitions for representation elections with the regional offices of the
Board. See 53 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1988).
424. See NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab.
L. Rep. (CCH) 9342, 19,178, 19,182 (July 2, 1987).
425. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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circumstances where there is a dispute, the Board will conduct a hearing. 26
Hospitals and unions may contest the application of the Rule.2 Hospitals
may seek to avail themselves of the "extraordinary circumstances" exception,
and unions may seek various combinations of the units established by the Rule
"in each case."' 2 8 The Rule will be expected to settle the unit question on
most occasions because of the employer's difficult burden of meeting the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" exception.' 29 Therefore, hospitals, by application
of the Rule, will receive the unit determinations "in each case,"' 30 but they
have no statutory entitlement to a unit determination solely through
adjudication.4 31
The Board, convinced of its statutory powers, turned to rulemaking due to
the Board's inability to persuade the courts of appeals to accept its common
law standards for unit determinations.'32 The decision was particularly pru-
dent because rulemaking afforded hospitals, unions, and other interested par-
ties access to provide and receive information, as well as an opportunity to
shape labor law prospectively, instead of merely reacting to the latest decision
by the Board. 3 3 In the course of the rulemaking proceedings, the NLRB was
able to gather industry-wide information about the incidence of strikes, sym-
pathy strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and wage competition among employ-
ees.' 3' That information enabled the Board to determine appropriate bargain-
ing units so as to meet two objectives: (1) to assure health care employees
their fullest freedom in exercising their rights to organize and bargain collec-
426. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,338
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
427. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)-(d) (1989).
428. The Rule limits bargaining units to the specific units enumerated "[eixcept in extraordi-
nary circumstances and in circumstance in which there are existing non-conforming units ....
29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1989). The Rule also permits labor organizations to seek combinations of
the eight units. See id.
429. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,345
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
430. Id. at 16,338 n.2. Assuming that the parties do not agree to using one of the Board's
established consent procedures, they will be entitled to a hearing. Id. During the hearing the
hospital may raise many questions, such as the placement of certain job classifications, supervisory
or managerial status, jurisdictional requirements, or try to avail itself of the "extraordinary cir-
cumstances exception." Id. Hospitals will still be afforded their unit decision in each case. It is
expected, however, that in most circumstances the Rule will be applied because individualized
adjudications will be conducted only if "extraordinary circumstances" are found to exist. Id.
431. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 382, at 11-12.
432. NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9342, 19,178, 19,180 (July 2, 1987).
433. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 713 n.13 (N.D. Il. 1989) (citing
Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 590-91 (1970)), appeals docketed, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir.
Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989); AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at
8 n.4; Stapp, supra note 292, at 71 n.65.
434. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,908
(1988) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
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tively under the Act, '4 and (2) to implement Congress' intent that the Board
should strive to prevent a proliferation of bargaining units in the industry.'41
B. Reconciling Competing Objectives: Assuring Employees Freedom of
Choice Yet Accommodating the "Congressional Admonition"
1. The Meaning and Effect of the "Congressional Admonition"
a. "Due consideration," not "sole consideration"
The American Hospital Association court enjoined the Board's Rule be-
cause it concluded that an eight-unit Rule violated Congress' "admonition" to
the Board to prevent proliferation of bargaining units in the health care indus-
try.137 The center of the court's decision lies in a flawed understanding of the
"congressional admonition." The court explained that it understood the "pol-
icy" against proliferation to mean that whenever the Board makes a unit deci-
sion in the health care industry, it "must use the means least likely to cause
unit proliferation."'' 38 The court's analysis resembles that of the rigid "dispar-
ity of interests" test which presumes that there are only two appropriate units
for health care institutions, professionals and nonprofessionals.' 9 However,
nothing in the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments supports
that proposition." 0 The "admonition" does not set so high a standard; it does
not direct the Board "to find the fewest possible number of health care bar-
gaining units."," To appreciate the source of the court's misunderstanding, it
is necessary to examine both the text and the context of the "admonition" in
order to discern what the "admonition" means and what, if anything, it re-
quires of the Board.
The text of the "admonition" is revealing. "Due consideration should be
given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health
care industry."" 2 Former Board Member Zimmerman, dissenting in St. Fran-
cis II, remarked that "[1]ess than a hundred words of the legislative history
warning against the proliferation of bargaining units have sparked a legal de-
bate that has now raged for ten years."" 3 The American Hospital Association
court's interpretation, that the Board "must use the means least likely" to
435. See supra note 158, 410.
436. NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 9342, 19,178, 19,181 (July 2, 1987).
437. American Hosp. Ass'n, 718 F. Supp. at 716.
438. Id. at 714 (emphasis added).
439. St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1040 (1982) (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting)
vacated. 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984); 265 N.L.R.B. at 1047 (Hunter, Member, dissenting).
440. St. Francis 11, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 956 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
441. Id.; see also Stapp, supra note 292, at 76 (stating that the "disparity of interests" test
subordinates employee organizational rights to congressional intent to prevent proliferation).
442. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57,
at 12; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57,
at 274-75.
443. St. Francis I1, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 955 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
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cause unit proliferation,'4 4 4 is not faithful to the text. The court seems to have
understood the "admonition" to mean that the Board must use the means least
likely to avoid bargaining unit proliferation-at all costs.""
The "admonition" does not require so extreme a result. In fact, it is simply
a "cautionary instruction" 4 ' to the Board to give "due consideration" to
preventing proliferation of bargaining units, not "sole consideration," as the
court seems to suggest.44 7 The very words "due consideration" imply that the
Board must evaluate other factors in addition to preventing proliferation when
it determines units for the health care industry.
4 4 8
One factor the Board must apply in unit decisions affecting all industries,
including health care, is section 9(b) of the Act.4 4 9 Section 9(b) requires the
Board to determine appropriate units so as to "assure employees the fullest
freedom" to exercise their rights to organize and bargain collectively under the
Act.450 The Health Care Amendments left section 9(b) intact; the Amend-
ments did not authorize the Board to disregard its 9(b) charge. Accordingly,
the words "due consideration" in the committee reports suggest that the Board
must balance two interests in making health care unit decisions. The Board
must balance the interest of assuring employees their "fullest freedom" in or-
ganizing with Congress's intent that the Board strive to prevent bargaining
unit proliferation. 4"1 The court, however, rejected this suggestion, finding that
preventing proliferation was more important. 52 The text of the "admonition"
does not require either interest, the employees' "fullest freedom" or the
"preventing [of] proliferation," to be wholly subordinated to the other.4"3
Despite the fact that the Board and the courts of appeals have balanced
both interests, a small but significant number of judges and commentators
have suggested that the "congressional admonition" should be given "no con-
sideration."' 5" They assert that the "admonition" has no legal effect, and thus,
requires nothing of the Board.4 55 Judge Fairchild, dissenting in Mary Thomp-
444. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 714 (N.D. Ill. 1989), appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989).
445. Cf. AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at 17 (stating that the "admonition" does
not mean to prevent bargaining unit proliferation at all costs).
446. St. Francis i, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1027 (1982), vacated, 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984).
447. Cooper & Brent, supra note 244, at 1070 n.74; AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382,
at 17-19.
448. Id.; see also Stapp, supra note 292, at 71 n.65, (arguing that the admonition means the
Board should balance employee organizational rights with the need to prevent proliferation, not
subordinate employee rights in order to prevent proliferation).
449. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988).
450. Id.
451. See supra note 158, 410, 435-36.
452. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 714 (N.D. Ill. 1989); appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989).
453. Stapp, supra note 292, at 71-72.
454. See supra notes 243-45, 323-24 and accompanying text.
455. Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980) (Fairchild, J.,
dissenting); accord International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 714
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son Hospital,45 6 stressed that the "admonition" is not helpful in interpreting
the Act because section 9, which governs unit determinations, had not been
changed by the Health Care Amendments. 4 7 Judge Buckley, concurring in
International Board of Electrical Workers, Local 474, expressed a similar
view.'5 8 Emphasizing that committee reports are not independent sources of
statutory law,'459 these judges stressed that it is not proper for the Board 460 or
the courts to attach legal significance to the "admonition."'' 61
b. The purpose of preventing proliferation
Despite these important criticisms, the majority of courts,'"2 and the NLRB
itself,463 have given weight to the "admonition.' 6' Congress did not amend
section 9 so as to designate appropriate units, but it did include the statement
on bargaining units in the committee reports. 465 Congress feared strikes, juris-
dictional disputes, and wage competition might occur and disrupt patient care
if each grouping of hospital employees were permitted to organize without any
restrictions.'6 6 Congress, however, did not define what kinds or how many
units would result in "undue proliferation.' 4 7 Instead, it left the task of strik-
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring); cf. NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1470 (7th
Cir. 1983) (stating that since Congress did not amend § 9(b) "maybe ... the statement in the
committee reports should be given no more weight than any other remote post-enactment legisla-
tion-which is not much") (Posner, J.); see also Cooper & Brent, supra note 244, at 1071 (stat-
ing that the "admonition" is purely hortatory and not legally binding upon the Board).
456. 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980).
457. Id. at 864 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting); accord International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814
F.2d at 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1987); id. at 720 (Buckley, J., concurring).
458. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 715 (Buckley, J., concurring). The
"admonition," they assert, may have been crafted to serve political rather than legal purposes;
perhaps the Board may be "courting a statutory change" if it does not heed their "admonition."
Mary Thompson Hosp.. Inc., 621 F.2d at 864 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting); see also International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 716 (Buckley, J., concurring) (commenting that the congres-
sional leaders expected the Board to heed the "admonition," "not because it had the force of law
but because agencies are not given to ignoring the commands of potentates who control their
budgets and oversee their operations").
459. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers. 814 F.2d at 718 (Buckley, J., concurring); Mary
Thompson Hosp., 621 F.2d at 864 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
460. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 720 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Buckley, J., concurring).
461. Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc., 621 F.2d at 864 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
462. See supra notes 227-42, 252-58, 267-72, 290-92 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 163-201, 259-65, 276-89, 300-09 and accompanying text.
464. See, e.g.. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Foods v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 632 (2d
Cir. 1983) (balancing traditional community of interest factors with the public interest in prevent-
ing bargaining unit proliferation "is the legal standard by consensus of the circuits").
465. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HisT., supra note 57, at
12; HR. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 57, at
274.
466. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
467. Failing to define the term "proliferation" has vexed the Board, courts, and commentators
for years, with little agreement over its meaning. See Zimmerman & Dunn, supra note 207, at 10.
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ing the balance between preserving employees freedom of choice in organizing
and avoiding the evils it associated with a proliferation of bargaining units to
the expert administrative agency, the Board.
468
2. Balancing Through Rulemaking
Rulemaking was particularly well suited to making health care unit deci-
sions. It enabled the Board 'to gather empirical evidence about the incidence of
strikes, jurisdictional disputes, wage "leap-frogging," and "whipsawing" in
multiple units.4 69 These very concerns prompted Congress to insert the "admo-
nition" in the committee reports.470 Armed with that information, the Board
carefully selected eight units designed to assure employees their organizational
rights while avoiding the evils Congress associated with a proliferation of units
in the health care industry."" The Rule should have been upheld precisely
because it addresses both of these concerns. The Rule does not focus solely on
preventing proliferation; it balances the purpose behind preventing prolifera-
tion, providing citizens with safe and adequate health care, with the employ-
ees' freedom to organize. " 2
A continuing problem has vexed the Board, courts, and commentators since
1974. Neither Congress, the committee reports, nor the statements of individ-
ual legislators stated what kinds or how many units would constitute prolifera-
tion. 47 ' An analysis of the Board's Rule begins with recognizing that the legis-
lative sources cannot provide an exact answer. Therefore, it is important to
keep the "admonition," the cases cited in the committee reports, proposed leg-
islation, and the statements of individual legislators in context and to be mind-
ful of the purposes behind preventing bargaining unit proliferation. 7 '
Labor and management frequently disagree on what Congress meant by the term in 1974. Com-
pare Fanning, Health Care Labor Relations, supra note 204, at 240-41 (stating that proliferation
probably referred to theoretically "dozens of units") with Emmanuel, supra note 193, at 192
(stating that the Board's initial unit determinations "by any reasonable definition of the term,.
constitute[ I unit proliferation") (emphasis in original).
468. See supra notes 126-56, 158, 410, 435-36 and accompanying text.
469. See NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab.
L. Rep. (CCH) 11 9342, 19,178, 19,181-82 (July 2, 1987); Collective Bargaining Units in the
Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,911-27 (1988) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §103.30).
470. See supra notes 125-56 and accompanying text. Congress' concern about proliferation
must be linked to the basic premise that "health care is not storable, and is often a life-or-death
matter ...." Cooper & Brent, supra note 244, at 1073. Despite this fact, Congress did not
prohibit strikes by employees of health care institutions. Congress, however, did require increased
notice for termination and modification of contracts, mandatory mediation, and ten day notice in
advance of strike activity of other work stoppages at health care institutions. See 29 U.S.C. §
158(d)(A)-(C), (g) (1988).
471. See supra notes 143-48, 353-80 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 158, 410, 435-36 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 127-54, 442-43 and accompanying text.
474. See Stapp, supra note 292, at 71 n.65. The author aptly observed that "hospital bargain-
ing unit proliferation is not inherently evil if it does not result in an increased risk of patient care
disruptions . . . .To blindly adhere to the congressional admonition ...ignores the reasoning
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Perhaps the most useful reference point to use in analyzing the Rule is Sen-
ator Taft's proposed bill."7" This bill would have permitted four bargaining
units in addition to the statutory requirement that guards be placed in their
own unit.'76 Although commentators have stressed the hazards of drawing in-
ference from congressional "inaction,"' 7 Senator Taft's bill is useful because
it helps to provide context in determining whether the number and types of
units selected in the Board's Rule might have implicated the proliferation con-
cerns in 1974. It is noteworthy that the Board's eight-unit Rule, on its face,
would add only three more units.17 8 A total of eight units, set against a back-
drop in which hospital industry representatives feared multiple units in hun-
dreds of job classifications and complained of dealing with bargaining units in
double digits, 479 hardly seems proliferative. The next sections of this analysis
will examine the professional and nonprofessional units established by the
Rule with reference to the historical context in which Congress wrote its
"admonition."
a. Nonprofessional employees
The Board's Rule virtually mirrors Senator Taft's proposal for nonprofes-
sional employees.'8 0 The Rule provides for five units of nonprofessional em-
ployees: technical employees, business office clerical employees, skilled mainte-
nance employees, guards, and all other nonprofessional employees.' 8' Senator
Taft's bill differs in one respect; it would have combined the nonprofessional
service employees and skilled maintenance employees in a single unit.' Given
the historical context, it strains credibility to believe that the addition of a
single unit, consisting of skilled maintenance employees, should be deemed
proliferative.' 8 ' This section will examine each of the five units with reference
behind that admonition, and defeats the purpose of the Act." Id.
475. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 457-58.
476. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988).
477. See Bumpass, supra note 111, at 882-86; King, supra note 108, at 148-49.
478. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1989) (the Rule designating eight units: (I)registered
nurses; (2) physicians; (3) all professional employees except for registered nurses and physicians;
(4) all technical employees; (5) all skilled maintenance employees; (6) all business office clerical
employees; (7) all guards; (8) all nonprofessional employees except for technical employees,
skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees and guards) with S. 2292, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 9(f) (1973), reprinted in LEcis. HIST., supra note 57, at 457-58 (designating
five units: (1) professional employees; (2) technical employees; (3) clerical employees; (4) service
maintenance employees; and (5) guards).
479. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
480. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1989) (Rule designating eight units) with S. 2292, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 9(f) (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 457-58 (designating
five units).
481. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1989).
482. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 457-58.
483. See AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at 16-17 (stating that "none of [the] units
permitted by the Rule is the type of specialized or craft unit which the hospital industry and its
supporters in 1974 feared").
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to the legislative history.
Despite Senator Taft's concerns about proliferation, his bill would have es-
tablished two of the five units established by the Rule: technical employees
and business office clerical employees, in addition to the guard unit required
by statute.484 It seems a fair inference that Senator Taft was satisfied that
those units would not implicate proliferation concerns. 85 Senator Taft's bill is
the lone congressional reference that mentions separate units of business office
clerical employees. It seems a fair inference that he, the most ardent advocate
of a statutory limit on units, would not deem that unit would cause prolifera-
tion.4 88 In addition, while the Senator did not refer specifically to guards,
guards are entitled to their own unit under the Act; neither Senator Taft's bill
nor the Health Care Amendments altered this long-standing statutory
requirement.
The Board's Rule designating these units to be appropriate is bolstered by
its finding that separate units of technical employees and business office cleri-
cal employees have not resulted in an increased incidence of strikes or jurisdic-
tional disputes.4 87 The Board also could find nothing to indicate that wage
competition such as whipsawing and leapfrogging had occurred.488 Apparently
this is the result of separate labor markets for these employees. 8 In addition,
so few units of guards have been organized that they could barely be said to
implicate any of the concerns that had motivated the "admonition. 4810
The Rule's remaining two nonprofessional units include a separate unit for
skilled maintenance employees and a nonprofessional employee unit consisting
of all nonprofessionals excluding technical employees, business office clerical
employees, skilled maintenance employees, and guards.48 1 The fundamental
difference between the Rule and Senator Taft's bill is that the Taft bill did not
provide for a separate maintenance unit.4 2 None of the cases cited in the com-
484. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988).
485. See AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at 17; see also Fanning, The Course of
Health Care Decisions, supra note 141, at 58 (criticizing those who opposed the technical em-
ployee unit as constituting undue proliferation; the hospital industry and Senator Taft had them-
selves endorsed such a unit in their legislative proposals). Furthermore, a technical employee unit
would be consistent with the Board's pre-amendment decision in Woodland Park Hosp., 205
N.L.R.B. 888 (1973). The Woodland Park court refused to grant a separate unit to a segment of
technical employees, but required all technical employees to be in a single unit. Id. at 889.
486. Furthermore, the business clerical unit was also supported by the hospital industry. See
Fanning, The Course of Health Care Decisions, supra note 141, at 58 (remarking that the unit
proposals of the hospital industry were eventually embodied in Senator Taft's bill).
487. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,909,
33,920, 33,926 (1988) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103,30).
488. Id. at 33,909.
489. Id. at 33,908-09.
490. NLRB Proposes Rulemaking on Bargaining Units for Health Care Facilities, 4 Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9342, 19,178, 19,189 (July 2, 1987).
491. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)(5),(8) (1989).
492. See S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 457-
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mittee reports speak directly to the issue of skilled maintenance units. 93 Sena-
tor Taft, however, did quite vigorously comment that the hospital industry
should not go the way of the construction industry and permit every job classi-
fication to have its own unit.494
A skilled maintenance unit does depart from Senator Taft's bill, nonethe-
less, it is responsive to many of the concerns he expressed in the floor de-
bates. 495 A separate unit consisting of skilled maintenance employees would
place all of the crafts and trades, for example, electricians, carpenters, plumb-
ers, in a single unit. This would avoid separate units for each trade and craft
as is common in the construction industry."96 A single skilled maintenance unit
that groups together numerous job classifications, each of which would be enti-
tled to its own unit in other industrial settings, seems responsive to Congress'
concerns about proliferation.49 In addition, the Board's selection of a skilled
maintenance unit is supported by its findings that separate units of skilled
maintenance employees had shown" little incidence of strikes and jurisdictional
disputes, and little indication of wage competition, such as whipsawing and
leapfrogging. Apparently this is also due to separate. labor markets for these
employees. 49
8
In summary, the five nonprofessional units established by the Board's Rule
are consistent with congressional intent. Congress intended to extend the orga-
nizational rights of the Act to employees of health care institutions in 1974,
while avoiding the adverse effects that motivated the "congressional
admonition."""
493. The committee reports did cite Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 N.L.R.B. 403 (1974),
with approval. See S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note
57 at 12; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra
note 57, at 274-75. In Four Seasons, the Board dismissed a representation of two maintenance
employees who performed unskilled maintenance work. Id. Thus, Four Seasons does not address
the issue of separate units of skilled maintenance employees.
494. 120 CONG. REC. 12,945 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 114.
495. See AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at 15-17.
496. Id. at 14, 16-17.
497. See id. at 16-17; NLRB Memorandum, supra note 382, at 24-25.
498. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,922-23 (1988)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
499. See AFL-CIO Memorandum, supra note 382, at 17; Sharo, supra note 331, at 821-22.
The preceding analysis of the nonprofessional employee units, supra notes 480-99 and accompany-
ing text, and the following analysis of the professional employee units, infra notes 500-15 and
accompanying text, draw heavily on comparisons to the units proposed by Senator Taft in his bill
that was not enacted by Congress. Standing alone, the Taft bill cannot be used as an indicator of
congressional intent because "[nionaction by a legislative body on proposed or introduced bills
provides an extremely unreliable and dubious foundation for drawing inferences." King, supra
note 108, at 148. This analysis, however, does not draw on the Taft bill alone. Rather, the bill is
useful not as an indicator of congressional intent, but because it helps to provide historical context
to those materials that are more probative of discerning legislative intent. These materials include
the committee reports and pre-passage statements of individual legislators, particularly those of
the author and sponsors of the legislation. See Bumpass, supra note 111, at 882; King, supra note
108, at 148.
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b. Professional employees
The Board's Rule stands in sharp contrast to Senator Taft's bill with respect
to professional employees.500 The Rule designates three professional units:
physicians, registered nurses, and all other professional employees,"'5 whereas
Senator Taft's bill would have designated only one all-professional unit. 50 2 The
differences, however, may not be as sharp as they first appear. An often over-
looked fact is that the Taft bill would have excluded physicians from the defi-
nition of employee, thus divesting them of any rights under the Act.503 The
Senator did not explain why he wanted physicians to be excluded from cover-
age. It seems a fair inference, however, that if he did want to exclude them,
then he did not believe that they shared the same interests or belonged in a
unit consisting of all professionals. Therefore, since physicians were not ex-
cluded, it seems reasonable that they would have been entitled to their own
unit. None of the other legislators addressed the issue of bargaining unit
proliferation by health care professionals, nor do the cases in the committee
reports address the issue. Only Senator Taft spoke to the issue, urging that
"professional interest and job classification" should not be entitled to form
The attractiveness of the Taft bill initially lies in the fact that it provides at least an idea of the
number and kinds of units that the Senator and the hospital industry regarded as not implicating
the proliferation concerns expressed by Congress. The temptation is to say that the units estab-
lished by the Board's Rule that mirror those proposed by Senator Taft could not have been
deemed proliferative by Congress in 1974. Congress, however, never acted on the bill. Therefore,
it would be improper to draw an inference from that failure to act. See King, supra note 108, at
148, 156.
This analysis resists that temptation. Instead it looks to the concerns that prompted Congress to
write its admonition-the fears of an increased incidence of strikes, jurisdictional disputes and
wage competition among employees-and Congress' decision to treat that concern not through the
statute but through the Board. See supra notes 462-68 and accompanying text. That the Board's
units in the Rule may mirror some of those that had the approval of Senator Taft and the hospital
industry, suggests that they may not have been deemed proliferative at the time; no stronger
statement is possible. More importantly, the units established by the Board's Rule are responsive
to the "admonition" because they address concerns expressed by Congress. Senator Taft feared
that the evils of bargaining unit proliferation might occur "[ilf each professional interest and job
classification is permitted to form a separate bargaining unit .... " 120 CONG. REC. 12,994
(1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 113. Therefore, the proper inquiry focuses not
merely on the number and kinds of units but also on the purposes of preventing proliferation. See
Stapp, supra note 292, at 71 n.65. As the foregoing analysis has shown and the following analysis
will further support, the Board's eight units are entirely consistent with the "congressional admo-
nition"; they do not implicate the adverse effects associated with proliferation that Congress hoped
to avoid. See supra notes 480-99 and accompanying text; infra notes 500-15 and accompanying
text.
500. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1989) (the Rule designating the professional units: (1)
registered nurses; (2) physicians; (3) all professional employees except for registered nurses and
physicians) with S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 9(f) (1973), reprinted in LEGiS. HIST., supra note
57, at 457-58 (designating one unit of professional employees).
501. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1989).
502. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 57, at 457-58.
503. Id. at 450.
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their own separate units.560 Considering the hospital industry's 06 fear of po-
tentially dozens of professional units, °60  allowing only two more units would
hardly seem to constitute proliferation. 50 7 A review of the Board's decision to
establish these professional units will indicate that they have not implicated
the proliferation issues that concerned Congress. 0 8
The Board's Rule grants only physicians, who have a unique role in the
industry, 50 9 and registered nurses, who have a singular history of representa-
tion and who would outnumber all other professional employees,510 the oppor-
tunity to seek separate representation.61 ' Although few "all other professional
employees" have been organized, the Board has found it appropriate and nec-
essary to create an all other professional unit to safeguard their organizational
rights under the Act.512 The Board's Rule is bolstered by its findings that sep-
arate units of registered nurses have resulted in little incidence of strikes, ju-
risdictional disputes, whipsawing, or leapfrogging, the items that motivated the
"admonition. 61  Furthermore, the Board found that there had been so little
organizing among physicians and all other professional employees that the rec-
ognition of those units had not implicated the proliferation concerns. 51
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Rule, which establishes eight
units, strikes an appropriate balance between preserving health care employ-
ees' ability to choose in organizing and avoiding the dangers that Congress
associated with a proliferation of bargaining units. 1 5 The district judge should
504. 120 CONG. REC 12,944 (1974), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 57, at 113.
505. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
506. See, e.g., Fanning, Health Care Labor Relations, supra note 204, at 240 n.5 (citing Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at A-5 (1975)) (stating that hospital administrator identifies 61 poten-
tially appropriate professional employee units).
507. See, e.g., Cooper & Brent, supra note 244, at 1072 (emphasizing that since Taft's pro-
posed bill was defeated and that the "admonition" was inserted, to move "one increment away
from the one professional unit, by allowing two units, does not amount to proliferation."); Sharo,
supra note 331, at 821-22 (stating that units established in the Board's Rule do not constitute
undue proliferation).
508. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,917-18
(1988) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 103.30).
509. Id. at 33,917; see supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
510. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,913-14
(1988); see also 196 Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH) Issue 46 at 4 (July 1990) (stating that "the
typical hospital has a large number of registered nurses and a smaller number of other
professionals").
511. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,917-18
(1988) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 103.30).
512. Id. at 33,918. Frequently, other professional employees "do not want to be in a unit that is
dominated by nurses. They fear that their interests will get subordinated to the nurses interests."
196 Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH) Issue 46 at 4 (July 1990).
513. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,917
(1988) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30); see also Cooper & Brent, supra note 244, at 1073 (not-
ing that "nurses rarely engage in strike activity").
514. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,917-18
(1988) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
515. See Sharo, supra note 331, at 821-22.
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have upheld the Rule precisely because the units established are responsive to
both concerns.
3. The Eight-Unit Rule Encourages Collective Bargaining and Furthers Na-
tional Labor Policy
The district court focused so heavily on the "congressional admonition"
against bargaining unit proliferation that it understated an obvious but impor-
tant fact. In passing the Health Care Amendments, Congress extended the
rights and responsibilities of the Act to employees of nonprofit hospitals. " 6
While the committee report language does stress the need to prevent bargain-
ing unit proliferation, the Second Circuit has aptly observed that "the main
thrust of the Health Care Amendments was to foster labor organizing under
the aegis of the National Labor Relations Board." 1 7 Instead of emphasizing
the primary purpose of the Health Care Amendments, the district court in-
stead stressed that the Rule would encourage "automatic fragmentation" of
the hospital industry work force and possibly coerce employees to organize
into the units established by the Rule.518
The courts suggestion is overstated. First, section 7 of the Act protects em-
ployees in their rights to refrain from joining labor organizations and exercis-
ing their rights to bargain collectively.519 Second, the Rule does not compel
organizing by hospital employees. The Rule brings certainty and predictability
to the hospital industry by informing employers, unions and employees about
what kinds and how many units will be appropriate absent "extraordinary cir-
cumstances." '20 Concededly, knowing in advance that certain units, such as
registered nurses or business office clerical employees, are appropriate will
probably encourage unions to organize hospital employees for collective bar-
gaining.52 The Rule, however, will eliminate much of the delay in representa-
tion proceedings because employers will not be able to defeat the "appropri-
ateness" of the unit unless they can show "extraordinary circumstances. 5 22
To the extent that the Rule encourages organizing and hastens collective bar-
gaining it substantially advances a national labor policy that promotes and
encourages collective bargaining.52 3
516. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
517. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Food v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 634 (2d Cir. 1983).
518. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 714 (N.D. Ill. 1989); appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989).
519. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
520. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a), (b) (1989).
521. Representatives of the New York State Nurses Association, Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, and International Union of Operating Engineers all viewed the Rule as establishing
greater opportunities to organize. See 3 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 387-88 (1989).
522. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1989).
523. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
V. IMPACT
A. The Effects of American Hospital Association v. NLRB
The American Hospital Association v. NLRB, 52 4 decision immediately and
significantly affects organization among hospital employees. The immediate ef-
fect is caused by the Board's decision to defer, until the Seventh Circuit de-
cides the appeal, all processing representation petitions of employees seeking
units of physicians, registered nurses, office clerical employees, and skilled
maintenance employees. " " Those employees are unduly hampered in their
abilities to exercise their rights of organization under the Act. To the extent
that any other organization occurs in the acute care hospital industry during
the appellate proceedings, the Board indicated that it would process those rep-
resentation petitions under the "disparity of interests" test. "26 As a growing
number of circuit courts recognized, however, the "disparity of interests" test
imposes too heavy a burden on employees and the unions. Neither the text nor
the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments suggests a presumption
in favor of only two units: professionals and nonprofessionals. 527 That result,
however, is the immediate and continuing impact of the district court's deci-
sion; employees continue to be unduly hampered in exercising the organiza-
tional rights assured by the Act. 2 8 The Board's effort to free hospital employ-
ees from the shackles of the "disparity of interests" test is frustrated by the
permanent injunction against the Rule. If the Seventh Circuit affirms the deci-
sion, the injunction will continue to restrict employee organizational rights
unnecessarily.
A Seventh Circuit decision that reverses the district court and vacates the
injunction, thereby upholding the Rule, affords greater and more meaningful
opportunities for health care employees to organize into bargaining units
within the Seventh Circuit's geographic jurisdiction. 2 Those employees would
then be free to organize into the eight units established by the Rule.2 0 None-
theless, a favorable Seventh Circuit decision cannot settle the validity of the
Rule in all of the circuits. The hospital industry can be expected to challenge
524. 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. I11. 1989); appeals docketed, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605 (7th Cir.
Aug. 1, 1989), No. 89-2622 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 1989).
525. 3 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 537 (June 7, 1989). Petitions for other units of employees are
processed under the "disparity of interests" test. Id.
526. Id.
527. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Food v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 642 (2d Cir. 1983);
see supra notes 281-82, 293-98, 310-14, 318-26 and accompanying text. The Board, however,
found a separate unit of technical employees appropriate under the "disparity of interests" test.
See Southern Md. Hosp. Center, 274 N.L.R.B. 1470, 1470 (1985).
528. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Food, 699 F.2d at 642.
529. The choice is more meaningful because, under the "disparity of interests" test, employees
must bear the burden of proving that a larger unit of professionals or nonprofessionals could not
adequately represent them. See supra notes 293-96, 300-06 and accompanying text. In contrast,
the Rule permits employees to organize in eight different units, and allows various combinations to
also be appropriate. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1989).
530. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1989).
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the validity of the Rule in other federal district courts not governed by Sev-
enth Circuit precedent 531 unless the Supreme Court decides the issue. 53 2
B. Legislative Proposals
With no assurance that the federal judiciary will resolve the issue, Congress
should consider taking steps to determine appropriate collective bargaining
units for the health care industry. Congress may address the problem in either
one of two ways. First, Congress could amend section 9 of the Act to designate
appropriate units for health care institutions within the language of the Act
itself, preferably by codifying, and permitting combinations of, the units estab-
lished in the Board's Rule. Establishing units by statute is hardly original;
Senator Taft offered a proposal to designate four appropriate units as part of
his effort to extend the NLRA to the health care industry.53 Moreover, a
number of states used that approach to address the problem of bargaining unit
proliferation in public employment.5 34 An amendment to the NLRA could be
structured in such a way so as to include historical bargaining units existing
prior to the amendment. This would protect historical unit configurations and
ongoing collective bargaining relationships.
Establishing appropriate units through the Act itself provides advantages to
all interested parties. Employers, employees, and unions each would know
which units were appropriate and could focus their attention on other issues
concerning the collective bargaining relationship. Moreover, to the extent that
it hastens union organizing and promotes collective bargaining, statutory des-
ignation of proper units implements a national labor policy which encourages
collective bargaining between employers and their employees.535 The disadvan-
tage of determining units through the statute is the lack of flexibility in re-
sponding to developments in the industry. Establishing collective bargaining
units by statute virtually eliminates the discretion and ignores the expertise of
531. See Estreicher, supra note 28, at 177 n.56 (stating that "[wlithout a statutory amend-
ment, centralization of challenges to rule validity in one circuit cannot be guaranteed").
532. Id. The Supreme Court denied petitions for writ of certiorari in cases involving hospital
bargaining units many times. See NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert
denied, 445 U.S. 971 (1980); NLRB v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); Bay Medical Center v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979); Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). Many of these denials were made before the split developed in
the circuits between those courts requiring or rejecting the "disparity of interests" test. Given the
importance of the issue, the losing parties will likely seek Supreme Court review of the Seventh
Circuit decision. Whether the court will grant such a petition is, of course, another matter.
533. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 9(f) (1973), reprinted in LEcis. HIsT., supra note 57, at
449, 457-58. After the NLRB adopted the "disparity of interests" test in St. Francis I. several
unions opposed the decision. The American Nurses Association proposed that Congress enact leg-
islation that would codify appropriate bargaining units for the health care industry and adopt the
seven units established by St. Francis I. See Daily La. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, at A-12 (Oct. 4,
1984).
534. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
535. 29 U.S.C § 151 (1988).
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the Board.
The second, and preferred alternative, is an amendment to section 6 of the
Act which would require the Board to use rulemaking when determining col-
lective bargaining units for the hospital industry. Requiring the Board to use
rulemaking powers when establishing collective bargaining units would un-
doubtedly end any possible conflict with the "in each case" language of section
9(b) of the Act. 36 Merely requiring rulemaking, however, would not be
enough. Congress must endorse the units established by the Rule, or alterna-
tively, provide guidelines in selecting units. Such action would avoid another
decade of litigation over the appropriate legal standard to use in applying the
"congressional admonition." For example, Congress could instruct the Board
to differentiate between acute care hospitals by size or by specialty. Addition-
ally, Congress could instruct the Board to use rulemaking for other health care
institutions, such as nursing homes and rehabilitation hospitals. Another op-
tion is codification of the Board's Rule as a rebuttable presumption. Codifica-
tion would place the burden on the employer to establish that a petitioned unit
is not appropriate.53 7 Ultimately, it is absolutely essential that clear guidelines
be given to avoid endless discussions of the meaning of the "admonition. '" 538
The idea of requiring the Board to estqblish units through rulemaking did
not originate here. During efforts to pass the Labor Law Reform Bill of 1978,
Congress previously considered requiring the Board to use rulemaking when
establishing bargaining units.5 9 The primary advantage of establishing units
through rulemaking, as opposed to designating units by statute, is the flexibil-
ity and freedom retained by the Board in applying the Rule and responding to
changes in the industry.54 0 Furthermore, the hospital industry would be free to
petition the Board to engage in other rounds of rulemaking through the "no-
536. The "in each case" language of § 9(b) does not prohibit the Board from using rulemaking
to establish collective bargaining units. See supra notes 409-36 and accompanying text. Nonethe-
less, the hospital industry argued otherwise and that argument may prevail in some forum. By
specifically amending § 6, Congress could end any doubts about the extent of the Board's
rulemaking power with respect to unit determinations.
537. The hospital industry suggested the use of rebuttable presumptions in response to the
Board's notice of proposed rulemaking. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Indus-
try, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,338 (Apr. 21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30). The Board
rejected this suggestion, stressing that "painstaking elicitation and examination of the facts of
each individual case is, absent extraordinary circumstances, neither helpful nor outcome determi-
native." Id. at 16,338-39.
538. Member Zimmerman, dissenting nearly six years ago in St. Francis II, remarked that
"there must be an end to the debate" over the appropriate legal standard to apply in health care
unit determinations. St. Francis Hosp. II., 271 N.L.R.B. 938, 955 (1984). That sentiment, even
more accurate today, was precisely what the Board hoped to accomplish by establishing appropri-
ate units through the Rule. See supra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
539. See Morris, supra note 348, at 41 n.148 (citing S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-
20 (1978); Koziara & Schwartz, supra note 331, at 83-84.
540. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,339
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30) (indicating the Board's open-ended attitude toward con-
sidering whether changes in the Rule might be desirable).
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tice-and-comment" rulemaking procedures of the APA.64
VI. CONCLUSION
The NLRB broke with a long-standing tradition of determining collective
bargaining units through adjudication when it used rulemaking to determine
collective bargaining units for the hospital industry. 42 Ironically, the Board
turned to rulemaking, as opposed to individualized adjudications, to give more
meaning to hospital employees' right to choose collective bargaining represent-
atives. Despite a statute instructing the Board to assure employees "their ful-
lest freedom" when making unit decisions, the Board and some courts of ap-
peals previously read the "congressional admonition" as limiting health care
employees to only two unit choices: professionals and nonprofessionals.543
Neither the Act nor the "congressional admonition" require such a result.
The "congressional admonition" against bargaining unit proliferation means
that hospital employees are not privy to the same range of bargaining unit
choices as their industrial counterparts. 5" Congress feared a multiplicity of
units would increase the incidence of strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and wage
competition among employees, thereby increasing disruptions in patient
care.645 In fashioning the Rule, the Board balanced the organizational rights
of employees against the public's interest in receiving uninterrupted health
care and determined that eight units were enough to meet both objectives.546
The Supreme Court and Congress, therefore, should approve the Board's Rule
precisely because it meets both of these concerns. Upholding the Rule will end
the protracted litigation regarding appropriate health care bargaining units
and give more meaning to the rights of hospital employees to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice.5 47
VII. POSTSCRIPT: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN AMERICAN
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On April 11, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit handed down its decision in American Hospital Association v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."4 8 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court and vacated the injunction "with directions to enter judgment for the
541. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
542. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,339
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30) (stating that the determination of collective bargaining
units in the health care industry was the Board's "first venture in major, substantive
rulemaking").
543. See supra notes 251-58, 266-72, 290-92, 300-06 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 126-56.
545. See supra notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 351-57, 442-51, 480-515 and accompanying text.
547. See Sharo, supra note 331, at 822-33.
548. 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Board. '54 9 Using an analysis similar to that proposed in this Note, the court
concluded that the Rule was consistent with the "in each case" language of
the Act,550 did not violate the "congressional admonition,"551 and was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
552
A. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Richard A. Posner observed that the
Board's standard for determining units in the health care industry through
case-by-case adjudication was "widely regarded as a failure." '53 After recog-
nizing that many courts, including the Seventh Circuit, felt the Board's use of
"substantive rulemaking power is long overdue,"' 5 the court examined and
rejected each of the three hospital industry arguments in favor of upholding
the permanent injunction against the rule.
The court preceded its analysis of the arguments by observing that the
Board's grant of rulemaking power is "explicit and broad."5 Additionally,
the court found nothing in the Act or in the legislative history of section
9(b)" 6 that precluded the board from using its rulemaking powers to deter-
mine collective bargaining units. 57 Further, the court rejected the hospital in-
dustry's argument that the "in each case" language mandated determination
of the appropriate unit on an individualized, case-by-case basis.658
After tracing the history of the Wagner Act,5 ' the court emphasized that
549. Id. at 660.
550. Id. at 656.
551. Id. at 659.
552. Id. at 659-60.
553. Id. at 660.
554. Id. at 655 (citations omitted).
555. Id. at 655.
556. Id. at 654. The court recognized the Board's statutory authority to determine the appro-
priate bargaining unit and the importance of that decision to employers, employees, and unions.
Id. Noting that the Act provides the Board with little direction in making unit decisions, the court
emphasized that the Act "can be read to suggest that the tilt should be in favor of unions, and
hence toward relatively many rather than relatively few units." Id. (citing NLRB v. Res.-care
Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1469 (7th Cir. 1983)).
557. Id. at 655-56. The court observed that "it is probable (no stronger statement is possible)
that Congress would have made an explicit exception for unit determination if it had wanted to
place that determination outside the scope of the Board's rulemaking power." Id. at 656.
558. Id. at 655. Referring to the argument that the Board must determine each "appropriate
unit on a case-by-case basis," the court stated "that such interpretations are regularly rejected in
decisions involving challenges to agency rules, such as the Social Security Administration's 'grid'
method of deciding entitlement to disability benefits." Id. at 655-56 (citing Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1983)).
559. Id. at 656. The court explained that it understood that the phrase may have been inserted
"to prevent the Board from bringing about a revolution in unit determinations." Id. The court
recounted the wide variety of potential units available: employer units, craft units, or plant units.
The American Federation of Labor primarily consisted of craft unions while the Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations consisted primarily of plant unions. Id. Had there been no "in such case"
proviso, the Board was free to rule "that all units would be craft units, or ... plant units, ...
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the word "case" may have many meanings. The court noted that the term
need not refer to "a particular dispute between a particular employer and a
particular union at a particular plant or establishment."560 The term may refer
to a particular industry, for example, health care, "or (as here) a subset or
submarket of an industry. '1"61 The court continued, noting that the term could
just as easily mean a "proceeding," covering both rulemaking and adjudicative
proceedings.562 In addition, the court suggested that the phrase could mean
that whenever the Board is called upon to make a unit decision, rules, like
statutes, must be applied case-by-case regardless of whether those rules were
developed through adjudications or rulemaking.563 Since neither the Act nor
legislative history indicated that the Board was barred from using rulemaking
powers in unit decisions, the court concluded that the Board did not exceed its
statutory authority in making the Rule.
564
Next, the court evaluated the hospital industry's argument that the Rule
violated the "congressional admonition" against bargaining unit proliferation.
In recounting the events leading to the passage of the legislation, the court
noted the efforts of the hospital industry to resist the extension of the NLRA.
"[N]ot having the muscle to defeat the extension," the industry pressured
Congress to require ten days advance notice of any strikes or job actions and a
statutory limit on bargaining units. " Referring to the Health Care Amend-
ments as a resulting compromise of a "collision of interest groups," the court
noted that the industry secured the ten day notice requirement, but failed to
win the limit on bargaining units.566 The industry did, however, persuade the
House and Senate committees to include the "congressional admonition" in
their reports accompanying the legislation.5 7
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a growing number of courts ques-
tioned the value of legislative history including the committee reports, hear-
ings, rejected bills, and floor debates as "illegitimate efforts to influence judi-
cial interpretation. 1568 The court, however, stressed that it did not endorse
such literature because "clarity depends on context, which legislative history
may illuminate." 66 Against this backdrop, the court examined the meaning
and effect of the "congressional admonition."
The court began by noting that the "admonition" was not a statute. Instead,
the court analogized the admonition to "a committee report that explains a
[and] altered the balance of power between the federations dramatically. The 'in such case' pro-
viso forbids the Board to do this." Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565..Id. at 657.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id. (quoting In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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newly enacted or amended statute,"57 0 and hence, it is entitled to some weight
in discerning congressional intent.571 Nonetheless, the court carefully pointed
out that the "admonition" was not a statute and could not be treated as
such." "To treat it as one would give the hospital industry something it tried
and failed to win from Congress." 5" The court suggested that the admonition
was not a command and instead was more like a cautionary instruction. 57 4 It
certainly was "not an amendment to section 9(b), decreeing that in the health
care industry no more than three separate bargaining units shall be
authorized. 5 75
Recognizing that the "admonition" must be given some weight, the court
next examined the Board's Rule in the context of the legislative history. The
court asserted that the cases cited in the committee reports did not speak to
the propriety of an eight-unit rule.5 76 The court found that the term "prolifer-
ation," in context, referred to many more groups than those proposed in the
Board's Rule.177 Drawing on testimony during the Senate hearings, the court
noted that New York alone recognized more than twenty-one separate bar-
gaining units under applicable state law. 578 "That is proliferation; that is the
sort of unit metastasis that 'due consideration' could be expected to persuade
the Board to disallow. 575
The court then turned to the last argument advanced by the industry in
favor of upholding the injunction: that the Rule was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 5 0 The hospital industry argued that the Rule did not adequately ac-
count for the diversity of the industry because hospitals having at least six
employees in any of the specified units will come under the aegis of the Rule,
570. Id. at 658.
571. Id. Referring to the "admonition," the court explained:
It accompanied the enactment of substantial amendments. The particular statutory
provision to which the admonition was addressed was not amended, but the effect of
the amendments was to apply that provision for the first time to the nonproprietary
hospital industry. Section 9(b) directs the Board to determine the 'appropriate' unit,
and what is appropriate may differ from one industry to another-may therefore
'mean' something different in one industry from what it means in another. So in
changing the domain of application of section 9(b), the 1974 amendments may have
changed its meaning without changing its words. The admonition can therefore be
regarded as a commentary on the meaning of the 1974 amendments and hence as
equivalent to pre-enactment legislative history ....
Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 659.
577. Id. at 658.
578. Id. (citing Hearings on H.R. 11,357 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 300-01 (1972)).
579. Id. (emphasis in original).
580. Id. at 659.
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regardless of the size or specialty of the hospital.581 Acknowledging that this
was an "important criticism," the court chastised the hospital industry for fail-
ing to suggest an alternative that would better serve the industry, yet preserve
the virtues of a rule.582 The industry suggested that the Board establish a re-
buttable presumption in favor of the three units permitted by statute: profes-
sionals, nonprofessionals, and guards.583 Judge Posner explained that "[sluch a
rule is no rule." ' Under the industry's plan, unions would have to bear "the
burden of persuading the Board to allow more units than the statutory mini-
mum." 58 The court rejected this as placing an intolerable burden upon the
unions.5
8 6
The court recognized that the Rule could not account for all of the diversity
of the industry.587 The court, however, emphasized that such is the conse-
quence of rules. "A rule makes one or a few of a mass of particulars legally
decisive, ignoring the rest. The result is a gain in certainty, predictability, ce-
lerity, and economy, and a loss in individualized justice." '588 Despite the court's
suggestion that the industry might have avoided some impact of the Rule by
raising the minimum to, perhaps, fifteen employees, the industry did not raise
the minimum.588
The court concluded that the Rule was not arbitrary and capricious because
the Board considered several possibilities in selecting the Rule and gave "plau-
sible reasons for its choice."5 90 Noting that it was not for the court to "fine-
tune the regulatory process by telling the Labor Board that its rule should
make slightly more distinctions than it does, or slightly fewer," the court up-
held the rule "without pretending that [they] consider[ed] it Utopia."' 9'
B. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit's Opinion
In a brief but powerful opinion, the Seventh Circuit rejected all three argu-
ments advanced by the hospital industry in favor of upholding the injunction.
The court squarely answered the issue that the district judge left undecided:
whether the Board may use rulemaking to determine appropriate bargaining
units without running afoul of the "in each case" language of section 9(b).5 92
Particularly imaginative was the court's treatment of the word "case." Draw-
ing on its understanding of American labor history, the court concluded that
the word "case" might refer to particular industries or subsets thereof, and
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 654, 659.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 659.
586. Id,
587. Id,
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 660.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 655-56.
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need not refer to individualized disputes between specific employers and em-
ployees. 593 The court was on even stronger ground when it suggested that the
"in each case" language could mean that whenever there are unit disputes, the
"rule, like a statute, is applied case by case."59 That position has been the
essence of the Board's arguments since the beginning of the rulemaking pro-
ceedings. The Board may apply a Rule, developed through the procedures of
the APA, to decide appropriate bargaining units that are consistent with the
language of section 9(b), which instructs the Board to make such decisions "in
each case."5 95
Perhaps the most controversial and compelling facet of the court's opinion is
its treatment of the "congressional admonition" against bargaining unit
proliferation. The court placed the proper amount of weight on the "admoni-
tion" by looking to the historical context shaping the passage of the Health
Care Amendments.59 6 Proliferation was an important concern of the hospital
industry and Congress in 1974."' 7 As observed by the court, however, the term
is properly applied to more units than those outlined by the Board's Rule."98
The court simply examined the Rule on its face in light of the historical con-
text regarding bargaining unit proliferation during 1972-1974. Had the court
analyzed each unit, as in this Note, an even more compelling argument could
have been made that the eight units do not constitute proliferation.5 99
The court's proliferation analysis, which approves of eight units, will be un-
doubtedly controversial. This is particularly true because the Board has had a
most difficult time persuading the courts of appeals to enforce bargaining or-
ders with two of the eight units; the difficulty arose with units consisting of
registered nurses and skilled maintenance employees.9 00 The Seventh Circuit's
deference to the Board on the bargaining unit issue stands in sharp contrast to
its earlier rebukes of the Board. 601 Those decisions, however, arose through the
review of Board unit decisions made through adjudication, not rulemaking.
The Seventh Circuit had a unique opportunity among the circuit courts be-
cause it was the first to confront the issue of industry-wide bargaining units.
Declining to find the Rule arbitrary and capricious, the court indicated that
the Board's Rule "was entitled to broad judicial deference," in contrast to its
former adjudication.602 Although the court did not refer specifically to evi-
dence supporting the Rule, the court commended the Board for doing "a re-
593. Id. at 656.
594. id.
595. See supra notes 371-75 and accompanying text.
596. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 656-59 (7th Cir. 1990).
597. Id.; see supra notes 84-90, 480-515 and accompanying text.
598. American Hos. Assn, 899 F.2d at 656-59.
599. See supra notes 475-515 and accompanying text.
600. See supra notes 211-46, 251-58, 266-72 and accompanying text.
601. See Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1978); see supra notes 236-45 and accompa-
nying text.
602. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 1990).
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sponsible job of weighing the conflicting arguments."6 3 While some may criti-
cize the Seventh Circuit for not describing a more probing examination of the
rulemaking record, the opinion suggests that the court studied the issue
enough to be convinced that the Board had given "plausible reasons for its
choice." 04
C. An End to the Debate?
The Seventh Circuit's decision was hailed as a great victory by labor organi-
zations.6"' Not surprisingly, the hospital industry was dismayed by the ruling
and vowed to challenge the decision. 6 On July 10, 1990, as expected, the
American Hospital Association filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court of the United States.60 7 In urging the Court to grant certio-
rari, the hospital association informed the Court that the rule could be liti-
gated in potentially forty-seven 5tates,606 unless the Court grants review. The
unions and the National Labor Relations Board are expected to join the AHA
in urging the court to grant the petition.60 9 American Hospital Association
presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to address the matter of
appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. The Court should
grant the petition and finally resolve the issue by upholding the decision of the
Seventh Circuit, and thus, the validity of the Board's Rule. In that manner,
hospital employees will finally be able to exercise a more meaningful choice of
selecting representatives for collective bargaining under the Act.610
James R. Anderson
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-12 to A-14 (Apr. 13, 1990).
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